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ABSTRACT
Child undernutrition is a serious issue in Nepal as 36% of children below five
years of age are chronically undernourished. Reducing child undernutrition is an
important priority to prevent adverse effects through the life course that perpetuate the
cycle of undernutrition and poverty.
Women’s intra-household bargaining power is an important determinant of child
nutrition. Intra-household bargaining power is an individual’s relative social and
economic position within the household to access and control resources, and influence
decision-making. In our research, we use women’s intra-household bargaining power as a
resource for care, which enables women to be exposed to nutrition information, gain
knowledge, access economic and social opportunities to improve food security, and
positively influence child nutrition. While there is evidence on the positive association
between women’s bargaining power and child nutrition, research gaps exist in
understanding the mechanisms through which this relationship is linked and the role of
men’s intra-household bargaining power in children nutrition.
We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data from 2012 of the
multisectoral program, Suaahara, in rural Nepal. We measured intra-household
bargaining power based on four domains: 1) ownership and control of assets, 2) social
participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. In the first
manuscript, we examined the relationship between women’s bargaining power and infant
and young child feeding (IYCF) practices in children aged 0-23 months, and tested if
iv

exposure to IYCF messages mediated this relationship. Exposure to IYCF information
mediated the relationship between social participation and early initiation of
breastfeeding and dietary diversity. Household decision-making control had a direct,
positive relationship with exclusive breastfeeding.
In the second manuscript, we examined the relationship between bargaining
power of women and men with child height-for-age z-score (HAZ) in children aged 0-59
months, and tested if household food insecurity mediated this relationship. Women’s
ownership and control of assets was positively associated with higher HAZ and food
insecurity partially mediated this relationship. Men’s social participation was directly
associated with higher HAZ and indirectly associated through food insecurity.
We found that different domains of women’s and men’s bargaining power relate
to child feeding and child nutritional status. Our study attempts to address the research
gaps by providing empirical evidence on men’s role in child nutrition and examining
potential mechanisms that may be targeted for nutrition programming and policy.
Strategies engaging men and women may prove effective for nutrition-specific and
nutrition-sensitive interventions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Despite a significant decline in the past two decades, the burden of child
undernutrition in Nepal is still high with 36% of the children below 5 years of age being
categorized as stunted.1,2 The first thousand days of a child’s life starting in-utero through
the first two years is a critical period for immediate and long-term growth and
development.3 Efforts to reduce child undernutrition are important because the adverse
effects of stunting span across the life course in early childhood development, schooling
outcomes, adult health and nutrition, birth outcomes, productivity, and income and
wages.4–6
Interventions to reduce child undernutrition increasingly employ nutrition-specific
and nutrition-sensitive strategies to address the underlying sociocultural and economic
issues that affect health behaviors, access to health and nutrition resources, and food
security, which ultimately affect child nutritional status.7 One important area for
nutrition-sensitive interventions is the improvement of women’s status within the
household and the community.8,9
Women’s household status, as explained by intra-household bargaining power,
and henceforth interchangeably used as bargaining power, is the relative social and
economic position of a woman within a household for accessing and controlling
resources, and her decision-making control. In our research, women’s bargaining power
refers to a mother’s bargaining power. Women can leverage their bargaining power to
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access socioeconomic and health opportunities and influence decisions for self and
family. Our research is guided by the Care for Nutrition conceptual framework by Engle
et al. (1999)10 where we use bargaining power as a resource for care. For the mother of a
young child, having high bargaining power can enable access to health information and
knowledge, social capital, and economic means, which can promote and improve
individual health behaviors, caring practices, and affect household-level determinants
such as household food security to positively influence child nutritional status.10,11
In South Asia, women’s bargaining power is gendered due to the social context
and cultural norms where men and women within a household are likely to have
differential say in decision-making and control of resources.12 There is evidence of a
significant, positive relationship between women’s bargaining power and child nutritional
status, but more research is needed to understand 1) the relationship between women’s
bargaining power and child feeding practices, 2) the relationship between men’s
bargaining power and child nutritional status, and 3) the mechanisms through which
women’s and men’s bargaining power relates to child feeding practices and nutritional
status.
It is important to understand the relationship between child feeding practices and
bargaining power because improving infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices is
critical to improving child nutritional status. A primary focus on improving behaviors
that support good child nutrition involve increasing knowledge and awareness to result in
behavior change for improved IYCF practices.13 Following appropriate IYCF practices
requires social, economic, knowledge, and human resources, which are more likely to be
accessed and used if women have high bargaining power. Research on IYCF
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determinants thus far mainly shows that sociodemographic factors such as mother’s
education, urban or rural setting, geographic location, and access to health services are
associated with IYCF practices.14–16
Understanding men’s bargaining power in relation to child undernutrition is
critical as men’s role is shown to be associated with other health-related factors such as
access to knowledge resources and health-seeking behavior,17–19 which can affect child
nutritional status. Research exploring men’s role in child nutrition has primarily focused
on paternal education or income. There is limited evidence on the relationship between
men’s household bargaining power and child nutritional status.20,21
Our research is focused on understanding the relationship of gendered intrahousehold bargaining and child nutrition by examining the mechanism linking this
relationship. Understanding the mechanisms increases the scientific plausibility of the
observed relationship between women’s bargaining power and child nutrition.
Understanding intra-household bargaining for women and men in the household and the
extent of their ability to make economic, social, and health decisions for improved child
nutrition is important to design targeted and effective interventions to improve child
nutritional status.
We used baseline data collected in 2012 from the first phase of Suaahara, a
multisectoral nutrition intervention project in Nepal. We created measures and indicators
of access to and control of resources and household decision-making of women and men.
We produced two manuscripts resulting from this research. In the first manuscript, we
analyzed the relationship between women’s bargaining power and four World Health
Organization (WHO)-recommended IYCF practices: 1) early initiation of breastfeeding,
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2) exclusive breastfeeding, 3) minimum meal frequency, and 4) dietary diversity in
children 0-23 months. We also examined if exposure to IYCF information mediated the
relationship between women’s bargaining power and IYCF practices.
In the second manuscript, we analyzed the relationship between women’s and
men’s bargaining power, and child nutritional status. We examined women’s and men’s
decision-making control to describe the gender dynamics within the household. We also
studied the association of women’s and men’s bargaining power with child nutritional
status and tested household food insecurity as a mediator of this relationship.
1.1 Goals and Outcomes of Dissertation Research
The overall objective of this research is to understand the role of gendered intrahousehold bargaining on IYCF practices and child nutritional status, and identify specific
paths connecting intra-household bargaining power and child nutrition. By studying
men’s and women’s bargaining power, this research contributes to the emerging literature
on men’s role in child nutrition, which is still considerably understudied. This research
will also contribute to the broader field of determinants of child nutrition and women’s
empowerment by 1) assessing how men’s and women’s bargaining power relates to child
nutrition by identifying specific domains of bargaining that are significant and 2)
understanding distinct mechanisms through which bargaining power relates to IYCF
practices and child nutritional status.
1.2 Specific Aims
1. To understand the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power
and IYCF practices in children aged 0-23 months
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1.1. To examine the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power
with four WHO-recommended IYCF practices (early initiation, exclusive
breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and diet diversity).
1.2. To examine if exposure to IYCF information mediates the relationship between
women’s bargaining power and IYCF practices
2. To understand the relationship between women’s and men’s intra-household
bargaining power with child nutritional status in children aged 0-59 months
2.1. To describe men’s and women’s household decision-making control.
2.2. To examine the relationship between intra-household bargaining power of
women and men with child nutritional status
2.3. To test if household food insecurity mediates the relationship between women’s
and men’s bargaining power and child nutritional status
1.3 Prior Studies on Women’s Bargaining Power
The baseline data from Suaahara has been used to assess the relationship of
women’s empowerment in agriculture with maternal and child nutritional status in two
studies. Women’s empowerment in agriculture index was used for the following
domains: 1) autonomy in agricultural production; 2) access and control of resources
including household assets, agricultural assets, and credit decision-making; 3) control
over use of income; 4) leadership as indicated by active group membership and public
speaking; and 5) workload and leisure time. In one of the studies, the aggregate measure
of women’s empowerment in agriculture was associated greater maternal body mass
index and maternal dietary diversity.22 Active group participation was associated with
greater maternal dietary diversity, while control over income and reduced workload was
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associated with higher maternal BMI. Women’s control over income was associated with
higher height-for-age z-score (HAZ) and dietary diversity in children 0-59 months.
The second study examined the relationship between women’s empowerment in
agriculture and nutritional status in children 0-23 months.23 Overall empowerment in
agriculture and three of its domains, namely autonomy in production, control over
income, and leisure time were positively associated with length-for-age z-score (LAZ).
The current research expands on the prior Suaahara-based studies to understand
the household dynamics and its relationship with child nutrition by 1) understanding the
relationship between multiple domains of intra-household bargaining power and multiple
IYCF practices, 2) examining individual level (exposure of IYCF information) and
household level (food insecurity) mechanisms to understand how bargaining power
operates to affect IYCF and child nutritional status, respectively, and 3) understanding
the role of men’s bargaining power and the relationship with child nutrition, which thus
far has not been studied.
In the following chapters, I first review the relevant literature around child
nutrition and bargaining power. Second, I describe the methods followed in conducting
this research. Third, I present two manuscripts that address the two specific aims of this
research. Lastly, I summarize the findings of this research and discuss the contribution to
literature and implications for future research, programs, and policies.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Presented in this chapter is the background literature on child nutrition and intrahousehold bargaining power. I provide an overview of child nutrition and feeding
practices in Nepal. I then summarize the literature on the role of women in child nutrition
to highlight the importance of understanding maternal determinants of child nutrition.
Intra-household bargaining power is defined and related literature is summarized,
specifically focusing on the different domains of bargaining power and how each domain
relates to child feeding practices and/or nutritional status. Lastly, as our research also
focuses on men’s role in child nutrition, relevant literature is described on this topic.
2.1 Child Nutrition in Nepal
2.1.1 Overview of Child Nutritional Status in Nepal
Child undernutrition is a serious issue in Nepal despite the significant gains in
reduction of undernutrition made in recent years.2,24 According to the most recent
Demographic and Health Survey, 2016 report, 36% of children below five years were
stunted (chronic undernutrition), 10% were wasted (acute undernutrition), and 27% were
underweight.1 The 2015 Millennium Development Goal for Nepal for a reduction in child
stunting to 30% was not met.25 Child undernutrition, especially in the first two years of
life contributes to larger maternal and child health issues such as child mortality, maternal
mortality due to the intergenerational cycle of undernutrition, and affects socioeconomic
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issues such as education and income generation.4,26,27 Child undernutrition is a result of
multiple socioeconomic and cultural factors.10,11 Understanding and addressing the
determinants of child undernutrition is an important priority for programs and policy.
2.1.2 Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices in Nepal
Child nutritional status is greatly determined by feeding practices in the early
childhood period.13,28 Infant and young child feeding encompasses several breastfeeding
and complementary feeding (breast milk plus semi-solid and solid foods) practices. Some
of the key WHO-recommended practices in the first 24 months of life include early
initiation of breastfeeding, i.e., putting a child to breast within an hour of birth; exclusive
breastfeeding for six months; age-appropriate introduction of complementary feeding;
consuming meals a minimum number of times in a day, known as the minimum meal
frequency; and having a diverse diet to meet the macronutrient and micronutrient
requirements, known as the dietary diversity.29 According to the 2016 Nepal
Demographic and Health Survey, the prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding for the first
six months of life was 66% and early initiation was 55%. The prevalence of minimum
diet diversity among children aged 6-23 months was only 35%.1
Following appropriate IYCF practices helps not only in providing adequate
nutrition, but only promotes general child health and development, and reduces the
incidence of common childhood illness. For example, exclusive breastfeeding is
associated with reduced incidence of common childhood illnesses such as diarrhea and
acute respiratory tract infections, which contribute to child undernutrition.30,31 Similarly,
exclusive breastfeeding is associated with early gross motor and cognitive development.
32,33
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Worldwide statistics on growth faltering suggest that LAZ, which measures longterm nutritional status sharply declines from 3 months to 24 months.34 Appropriate
introduction of complementary feeding through adequate quantity and quality of semisolid and solid foods in addition to breast milk is required for the growing infant beyond
six months to meet the increasing and diverse nutrient requirement. Dietary diversity, a
measure of complementary feeding quality, has consistently shown a significant
relationship with child nutritional status, especially with HAZ and prevalence of
stunting.35 Interventions targeting improved complementary feeding have also shown to
be effective not only in improving IYCF practices but also child growth.36,37
2.1.3 Window of Opportunity for Improved Child Nutrition
The coincidence of the sensitive phase of rapid growth and development in
children and period of child feeding practices in the first two years of life highlights the
importance of addressing child undernutrition in the first 1000 days of life. Public health
practitioners and researchers have called for increased promotion of IYCF practices as an
important strategy to combat child undernutrition in developing countries.13,38–40 Current
public health strategies have moved toward more integrated approaches to reduce
undernutrition, and therefore understanding the sociocultural determinants of feeding
practices and child nutrition is important for informing effective programs and policies.41
2.2 Role of Women in Child Nutrition
Determinants of child nutrition are varied, complex, and often interact with one
another. The UNICEF conceptual framework (1990) for child undernutrition explains the
basic, intermediate, and proximal factors leading to child undernutrition.42 These factors
affect an individual’s health and nutrition within the social, economic, and political
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context, which provide the necessary resources for women to facilitate for better nutrition
and care practices that support optimal child nutrition, growth, and development. Engle
and colleagues (1999) presented a modified UNICEF conceptual framework known as
the Care for Nutrition conceptual framework to elaborate the concept of care for child
health and nutrition. They defined care practices as “the practices of caregivers that affect
nutrient intake, health, and the cognitive and psychosocial development of the child”(pp.
1310).10 They further elaborated on the resources needed for caregivers to optimally care
for children such as education, health and nutrition status, knowledge and beliefs,
autonomy and control of resources within the household, workload, social support from
family members and community. These caregiver characteristics are influenced by
broader economic, social, and political contexts. Women’s position in a household and
her ability to leverage that position can increase her access to and control of resources
that could positively impact child nutrition outcomes.
Gender is an important social determinant that intersects with the broader
economic and social context, and with several proximal factors affecting undernutrition
such as food security, access to health care and information, and human capital.12,43,44
Improved role of women in the household and community is shown to be associated with
better maternal and child nutritional status.43,45,46 Below, I discuss how women’s role is
tied to the basic and proximal determinants of child nutrition and then specifically discuss
intra-household bargaining as a determinant of child nutrition.
2.2.1 Socioeconomic Context and Role of Women
Poverty is one of the fundamental causes of child undernutrition. Economic
growth is associated with improved child nutritional status. For example, one multi-
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country analysis showed that GDP growth of 5.5% annually, predicted a 1% reduction in
prevalence of stunting per year, translating into a large cumulative effect over years.47
Women’s education and employment is shown to contribute to national growth in
developing countries. For example, a regional analysis of across Africa, Asia, and Latin
America showed that gender inequality in education directly affects economic growth
and also has an indirect effect through reduced human capital.48 Another study in India
found that female education in terms of enrollment rates in school and average rate of
education significantly contributed to economic growth.49
Household economy and assets are also strongly associated with better child
nutritional outcomes.2 Gender norms within the broader social context define women’s
role related to access and use of household economic resources.50 Research suggests that
greater women’s economic control has a positive effect on household economy, income
generation, and maternal and child nutrition.22,23,51,52
Social context in a setting can create opportunities or constraints that affect child
nutrition. Maternal education, as a resource for care, is an indicator of social development
on broader scale and is shown to be associated with child nutrition. A multi-country study
involving 85 countries found that higher national female literacy levels were significantly
associated with reduction in childhood stunting.53 Maternal education also matters at the
household level, and is one of the most basic and commonly included variables in child
nutrition and public health studies. It is shown to have a strong, positive effect on child
nutrition.47,54,55 One important mechanism through which maternal education affects child
nutrition is better health knowledge and improved health care utilization. For example, a
study in Bolivia to elucidate the pathways between maternal education and childhood
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stunting found health-care utilization for essential care such as prenatal care, institutional
delivery, receiving tetanus injection before birth, and using modern contraception
significantly explained the effect of maternal education on child nutrition.56 Similarly,
one study in Lesotho found that the nutrition knowledge mediated the relationship
between maternal education and child wasting, with a greater effect among wealthier
households.57 Maternal education is shown to improve women’s status, affect greater
decision-making for self and children, and provide equitable health care for children.58
Social construction of gender norms affects women’s status at home and outside
the household. Patriarchal societies in South Asia have been shown to influence women’s
access to economic and social resources, and decision-making control. For example, one
review on women’s status in Asian countries noted several institutional forces including
laws restricting female ownership of assets, prohibition from working outside, perception
of male dominance, and inability of women to carry forward family name affected
women’s status in the society and the household.59 Similarly, a study in India and
Pakistan found household decision-making control, mobility, experience and protection
from domestic violence, and control over economic resources was a result of gender
stratification within the society that provided differential and unequal access to and
control of resources for men and women.60 It was also noted that equal status for men and
women, controlling for other socioeconomic indicators had a significant, positive effect
on child nutritional status.
2.2.3 Maternal Characteristics as Human-Capital for Child Nutrition
In general, maternal characteristics link the proximal and distal factors that affect
child nutrition. The cyclic nature of maternal and child nutrition is strongly showcased in
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several studies that examined the relationship between maternal health and child
nutrition. For example, maternal height is consistently shown to be an important predictor
of child nutritional status.4,61,62 A six-country study found the prevalence of child stunting
at two years was significantly more in shorter mothers and those children were more
likely to be shorter in adulthood.63 Maternal anemia is a common health issue in
developing countries and associated with anemia in children. For example, one study in
Mexico estimated that maternal anemia was associated with a three-fold increased risk of
low hemoglobin levels in infants.64 In Indonesia, normal birth weight infants with anemic
mothers had 80% higher odds of being anemic, and low birth weight infants had more
than three times the odds of being anemic at 3-5 months of age than mothers who were
non-anemic.65 Anemia in children is detrimental to physical and cognitive development
in their critical growth period, which can in turn hinder optimal growth and development
during the critical first two years of life and beyond.3,66
2.3 Overview of Intra-household Bargaining Power
Sociocultural norms in patriarchal societies such as in South Asia govern the role
of men and women within a household. Low women’s status in such settings creates
inequality in access to and control of resources, and their decision-making power.12 A
way to understand the differential position between men and women in a household is
through intra-household bargaining power. Intra-household bargaining is primarily an
economic concept that describes a household as a collective where members may have
preferences on household consumption or production, which can create conflicts.67–69
Resolution of any conflict depends on the members of a household that have the power to
negotiate or influence an outcome. Economists describe this (bargaining) power as the
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“threat point”,67,69 which is an “individual’s social and economic position if the
household were to breakdown” (pp 325).17 Intra-household bargaining refers to the
relative social and economic position of individuals within a household for accessing and
controlling resources and decision-making power.
Intra-household bargaining can be a result of gendered social norms and
institutional factors such as laws and policies, which may provide differential access to
resources due to gender.68,70 In most settings in South Asia, gendered roles tilt intrahousehold bargaining power in favor of men. This inequality creates and reinforces the
differential position between men and women within a household and may affect child
nutrition outcomes.
While the concept of intra-household bargaining is economic in nature, its has
sociocultural underpinnings that have commonality with the basic determinants of child
undernutrition.10 In the current research, we examine the relationship between intrahousehold bargaining power as indicated by access to and control of resources and
decision-making power and child nutrition outcomes, to highlight the role of household
gender dynamics in child nutrition.
There are two main dimensions of intra-household bargaining: 1) access to and
control of resources, and 2) decision-making control.12 Access to and control of resources
and decision-making control usually have a reciprocal relationship where higher access to
and control of resources can lead to more decision-making control and vice versa.67,71
1. Access to and control of resources
Intra-household bargaining power is an unobservable construct. Economists use
proxy measures of access to and control of financial resources and education to study an
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individual’s position in a household. In addition, time and social resources are also
important to study when examining the relationship between intra-household bargaining
and child nutrition as these factors can affect access to health resources, knowledge, and
caregiving behaviors, which can influence child nutrition.
Access to and control of mainly economic resources can increase an individual’s
ability of bargaining in household matters and therefore, education, income, employment
and ownership of assets are commonly used as proxy measures.71–73 Education can lead
to more self-awareness, independent thinking, and informed decision-making, which is
shown to be associated with greater decision-making power and improved maternal and
child health nutrition outcomes.74,75 Women’s employment and control over income puts
them in a better position to negotiate household decisions.67 Working outside the home
can increase an individual’s social capacity for interactions, increase social capital, which
can also influence household bargaining.67 Ownership of assets refers mainly to the
access to financial resources, which not only provides a fall back option when needed to
support the household but also improves decision-making power related to the asset as
well as other household decisions. Studies have demonstrated a positive relationship
between women’s ownership of assets and maternal and child health outcomes.71–73
Time is a resource that is gendered, with unequal allocation for women and men.
Women tend to have higher workload than men as a result of being involved in
household chores, in caretaking for young children and elders, and contributing to
household income or food production through employment, wages, or subsistence
farming.76 There is leisure time inequality between men and women, which can increase
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time constraints, adversely affect maternal well-being, and negatively impact child-care
practices.77–79
Like economic resources and time, social resources such as social capital can
affect an individual’s decision-making and influence child nutrition outcomes. Social
resources such as access to groups like microcredit groups, mothers’ group, agriculture
groups can provide social capital which can lead to informational support, increase social
awareness and social capital, and influence bargaining within the household.69,80
2. Decision-making control
Decision-making control is a part of bargaining power, where an individual can
exert their influence to make household decisions.71,81 Greater decision-making control
for women related to family issues, reproductive health, domestic violence, and mobility
is associated with improved child nutrition outcomes.82,83 Indeed, the relationship
between decision-making and access to resources such as education, income,
employment is bi-directional because both factors are governed by social norms and
while women with greater assets or resources would have more power to make decisions,
better decision-making control could also lead to gaining access to education, having
more say in income and employment activities, and owning more assets.
Overall, evidence shows that higher access to and control of resources, and better
decision-making control are associated with improved child nutritional status, but little is
known about the relationship between intra-household bargaining power and infant
feeding practices beyond the effect of women’s education or income. Intra-household
bargaining power may affect important health and human resources required for
improved caregiving (appropriate IYCF) practices and child nutrition outcomes.
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The traditional roles of men and women produce differential intra-household
bargaining, but less is known about how men’s role in intra-household bargaining is
associated with child nutrition outcomes. Understanding these relationships will provide
evidence for effective program interventions and policies to promote not only child
nutrition but also women’s empowerment and maternal well-being.
2.3.1 Intra-household Bargaining and Women’s Empowerment
Empowerment is a process of increasing an individual’s ability to make choices
that facilitate the individual to take necessary actions that lead to the desired outcome.84
This process is specific to those who have thus far been deprived of the opportunity to
make choices to bring about a change within their social, economic, and political
context.85 Women’s empowerment can be explained as a process by which women
redefine their roles within the household and community in a way that expands their
abilities as decision-makers and agents of action for self and family where they
previously faced restrictions.86 Women’s empowerment could be used as a measure of
bargaining power over time.76 Similar measures about access to resources and decisionmaking that constitute intra-household bargaining have been used to examine the effect
of empowerment on several maternal and child health outcomes.82,83,87
2.4 Intra-household Bargaining Power Domains and Child Nutrition
The discussion thus far underscores the importance of understanding the role of
women in child nutrition, examining specific paths, and devising interventions that
consider women’s role in the household and the community. In our research we focus on
four specific intra-household bargaining power domains: 1) ownership and control of
assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control.
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Described below is a review of evidence detailing the relationship between four specific
domains of bargaining power used in our research.
2.4.1 Ownership and Control of Assets and Child Nutrition
Women with economic assets are more likely to have higher bargaining power,
which can have a positive influence on child nutritional status. For example, based on a
nationally representative sample, Allendorf (2007) found that women’s land ownership
was positively associated with decision-making related to household economy, women’s
mobility, and own health. Women’s land ownership also significantly reduced the odds of
prevalence of stunting and underweight in children under five years of age.70
Women’s control over assets is also associated with other aspects of child wellbeing, which may be related to child nutrition. Study on men’s and women’s economic
assets and education found that woman’s assets and husband’s education were positively
associated with expenditure on children’s education, while only husband’s assets was
related to food expenditure in Bangladesh.88 Overall financial autonomy or equal say in
household economic decision-making significantly affects child nutritional status, but the
several indicators for it have shown to have differential effect. In a study on the effect of
women’s financial autonomy and stunting in children under 36 months, in Andhra
Pradesh, India, found that children of women who had the ability to set aside money for
use as they choose had 23% lower odds of stunting than those who did not. The study
however found no effect of decision-making related to purchase of large household items
on stunting.89
Another study in India of mother-child dyads in children 3-5 months found that
mother’s financial autonomy increased odds of exclusive breastfeeding by 26% after
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adjusting for confounding, but found no significant association with LAZ, weight-for-age
z score (WAZ), or weight-for-height z score (WHZ).90 Women’s empowerment in
agriculture, and specifically, women’s control over income was positively associated with
child HAZ in Nepal.22 Overall, having more control of assets may result in women
leveraging their bargaining power to access information and economic resources that can
enable women to care more effectively for their children by improving feeding practices,
improving diet quantity and quality, and ultimately improving child nutrition.
2.4.2 Social Participation and Child Nutrition
Women’s social capital can have a positive effect of child health and nutrition.91
Social participation increases access to social capital. Social capital is defined “as
resources embedded in social structures which are accessed and/or mobilized in purpose
actions” (pp35).92 Social capital can improve access to food and health resources,
knowledge networks, improve economic and living conditions, improve psychological
and emotional well-being, which together can help in self-efficacy for child care,
increased food security, reduction in child illnesses, and improvement in child health,
which ultimately leads to improved child nutritional status.80 Literature on the effects of
social capital on child nutrition has broadly focused on two types of social capital: 1)
structural social capital, which encompasses group membership and extent of
participation, citizenship, and social network characteristics and 2) cognitive social
capital, which is how an individual feels about trust, reciprocity, sharing, and support.80,93
A number of studies related to social capital have analyzed data from the Young
Lives (YL) study in Andhra Pradesh, India, Vietnam, Peru, and Ethiopia. The YL study
used a number of measures of structural and cognitive capital. One study focusing on
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children aged 6-18 months found that high cognitive social capital was associated with
improved LAZ and WAZ among children, but did not find community group
membership to be associated with child nutritional status. Additionally, it found that
involvement in citizenship activities was negatively associated with HAZ in India, but
was positively associated in Vietnam.80 Another analysis of the same dataset found no
association between any of the above-mentioned social capital measures with prevalence
of stunting in children under one year of age in India.94 Another YL study examined the
size of the network and network characteristics in the same sample in India and found
that larger network size and a network with higher literacy level were significantly
associated with higher LAZ.95 The study also found that mother’s network comprising of
non-family members was negatively associated with LAZ. Recent studies in Nepal
examining women’s empowerment in agriculture have analyzed the social domain based
on active participation in group membership and found that group membership was
related to maternal nutrition, but did not find any relationship with child nutrition in
children under two years or children under five years.22,23
Studies promoting social capital through group membership have also shown
improvements in child feeding behaviors. In developing countries, interventions have
incorporated social components such as mother-to-mother support groups, group prenatal
services, i.e., increased structural social capital with an aim to increase knowledge and
awareness of different practices and have noted some success for exclusive
breastfeeding.96,97 For example, a group-based intervention with expectant mothers in
Uttar Pradesh, India showed that recommended feeding practices immediately after birth
including feeding colostrum, early initiation of breastfeeding, and exclusive breastfeeding
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for the first week improved among those in the intervention group.98 An intervention
combining health programming with self-help groups in India showed that women in the
intervention group had significantly higher odds of feeding colostrum than the control
group.99 Research is still need to test specific mechanisms through which group
membership may influence behavior change and improve IYCF practices.
2.4.3 Workload and Child Nutrition
Time as a resource for child nutrition is relatively understudied.82,100 Discussion
about time allocation and workload is often studied as gendered time indicating the
differential availability and use of time for engaging in different activities between men
and women. Gendered time in low- and middle-income countries can be a result of
several sociocultural factors including the traditional role of men and women in the
society, related norms that perpetuate this distinction, household composition in terms of
number and gender, environmental factors and agricultural seasons, farming patterns,
availability and access to basic utilities, and health and social services.101 Women spend
significantly more time than men in child care, with recent estimates for South Asian
countries like India and Pakistan suggesting women spend ten times as much time on
unpaid child care as men.78
Related to gendered time is the concept of time poverty which is defined as “the
lack of enough time for rest and leisure after accounting for the time that has to be spent
working, whether in the labor market, doing domestic work, or performing other
activities such as fetching water and wood” (pp.45).102 Women in developing countries,
especially in rural areas bear the burden of being involved in productive activities for
income as well as household chores leading to higher workload and limited time for rest
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and leisure even during sensitive phases such as pregnancy.103,104 Increased domestic
workload can also hinder employment for women. For example, the Demographic and
Health Survey (2011) from Nepal revealed more workload at home as a reason for not
working outside. Those with the least education have the most workload at home.105
Time constraints and high workload can also lead to inadequate care for young children,
who are often looked after by an older child or sibling in the family.78 Time constraints
and inadequate child care can lead to insufficient time for appropriate IYCF practices.103
While research on time allocation and child feeding in South Asia is limited, one
qualitative study in Nepal to identify behavior change strategies for better IYCF practices
found that mother’s paucity of time and labor work activities hindered exclusively
breastfeeding.79 Two studies in Nepal examining women’s empowerment in agriculture
also found that reduced workload as measured by total number of hours worked in a day
was associated with maternal higher BMI and availability of leisure time for mothers was
associated with higher LAZ in children under two years.22,23 Studies have also examined
women’s work status, employment, and income as indicators for women’s workload. For
example, in a study in India, mother’s current and previous employment was negatively
associated with WAZ.106 Another study from a nationally representative data in India,
however, found that children of working women had higher WAZ than non-working
women. Variation in research findings related to time allocation or workload and child
nutrition highlight complexity of this issue. On the one hand, working women can
contribute to household income, which can positively affect nutrition status, while on the
other hand, overburden and time constraints, especially with gender-specific roles, can
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also likely result in inadequate care for the child and the mother, which can negatively
impact feeding practices and child nutritional status.
While there is some evidence of time and workload affecting child nutritional
status, there is limited evidence examining the linking factors between workload and
IYCF practices. Workload is likely to affect not only exclusive breastfeeding but also
complementary feeding through time insufficiency for preparation of nutritionally diverse
food or practicing responsive feeding, which is shown to be associated with better child
nutritional status and early childhood development.107,108
2.4.4 Decision-making Control
Household decision-making on aspects related to health for self and child, family
planning, and domestic violence are commonly studied indicators for empowerment or
autonomy, and in general, have shown to have a positive relationship with child
nutritional status.82,83 While there is some variation in the results in different settings,
greater decision-making control is shown to be associated with better child nutrition.
An analysis from a nationally representative sample in Nepal found that HAZ was
significantly higher in children where mothers had a final say in sole or joint decisionmaking about seeking health care for self.109 The study also found that difficulty in going
alone to get medical care for self was associated with lower WHZ but found no
association with HAZ. There was no association between getting permission to access
care and HAZ, stunting, or WHZ. Overall, the study showed greater decision-making has
a positive association with several child nutrition measures.
In a study in India, Shroff et al. (2009) showed that with regards to mobility, not
needing permission to go to the market was associated with significantly lower odds of
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child stunting, but stunting was not associated with decision-making related to going and
staying with parents or siblings and permission to visit friends and relatives.89 In another
study in India, Shroff et al. (2011) found that autonomy in child-care decisions was
associated with increased LAZ but did not have any effect on WAZ and WLZ.90 A study
in Afghanistan showed that lack of maternal autonomy, as measured by needing
permission to see a doctor for child health care and having the requirement to be
accompanied by someone to see a doctor, was significantly associated with higher odds
of stunting.110 Decision-making related to family planning was positively associated with
WAZ in children 0-5 years in Pakistan.21 An analysis of factors influencing child
nutrition in Southern India found that women’s position in the household and
involvement in major household decisions was positively associated with WAZ; other
empowerment variables such as mobility and control for food supply did not show any
relationship with WAZ.106
The evidence above suggests that disempowerment in this domain limits access to
economic and health-care resources. Utilization of health services is shown to be related
to IYCF practices,111,112 therefore, it is important to examine if bargaining power has an
impact on IYCF practices.
2.4.5 Food Security and Role of Women
Household food security is a proximal factor that affects child nutrition through
food availability and diet diversity, and is shown to be associated with maternal factors
such as education and her role within the household. 113,114 Diet quality is an important
predictor of child nutritional status.35 Food security affects the quantity and quality of
diet.115,116 Maternal education has a positive relationship with household food security
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and is shown to be independent of socioeconomic status or income. Women with higher
education status make better decisions about equitable food allocation for children and
better diet quality, which ensures consumption of essential micronutrients as well as
macronutrients for optimal child growth and development.114,117 Women’s bargaining
power can, therefore, affect household food security through women’s role in food
production, procurement, allocation, and preparation.
2.5 Men’s Intra-household Bargaining Power and Child Nutrition
While there is research on women’s access to and control of resources and
decision-making control affecting child nutritional status, there is less information about
men’s bargaining power and its effect on child nutrition. Most studies have examined
men’s role in terms of father’s education as determinant or confounder for child
nutritional status or health. Fathers with higher educational attainment are more likely to
have economic resources that can help with uptake of health services, provision of food
and other household necessities to improved child nutritional status. For example,
analyses from large-scale nutrition surveillance data from Indonesia and Bangladesh
revealed that father’s education significantly reduced the odds of stunting in children
under five years and that paternal education was also associated with other nutritionally
important practices such as vitamin A supplementation and use of iodized salt.20 Another
study based on a household survey in Pakistan tried to elucidate pathways linking
parental education and child health outcomes. It found that father’s education was
positively associated with child immunization through father’s health knowledge.21 One
study in rural Madhya Pradesh, India found that illiterate fathers had the highest odds of
children being underweight, stunted, or wasted as compared to those with higher levels of
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education. There was also a gradient-effect, where the odds of undernutrition were
highest in the lowest levels of education.118
Importance of father’s involvement in child nutrition and feeding practices is also
evident through intervention studies and qualitative inquiry. Much of the research related
to father’s involvement and influence on breastfeeding practices is from developed
countries, which points to the emotional and informational support that women received
from the child’s father.119 For example, a 2-month intervention with expectant fathers on
the management of breastfeeding found that those in the intervention group were
significantly more likely to have babies that were exclusively breastfed for six months
than in the control group and the mothers were less likely to encounter problems such as
perceived milk insufficiency.120 A qualitative study in the U.S. found that low-income
mothers had positive attitudes and knowledge towards breastfeeding when they received
encouragement from the baby’s father to breastfeed.121
While information is available on father’s education and support, less evidence is
available on gendered bargaining power as a potential determinant of child health and
nutrition. No evidence is available on how gender dynamics and intra-household
bargaining affects child nutritional status and feeding practices. As discussed earlier,
social and cultural norms affect women’s position, expected roles, and women’s
bargaining power in the household. These norms also influence decision-making and
household bargaining between a man and a woman. Women are more likely to be
involved in household care activities, while men are involved in income generation, work
outside home, and are responsible for expenditure on household items. A qualitative
study in Ghana highlighted that women’s lack of economic support or autonomy affected

26

health-seeking behavior for children with malaria.122 The results from this study also
suggested that husbands had a final say about where the child should be taken to a clinic
and often controlled the payment for the same. Less involvement of father or refusal to
pay resulted in delayed care for the child. The study also found that in case of
disagreement between husband and wife about the place and expense to seek care,
usually, the father had the last say, which also led to delayed health-seeking behavior.122
Another study in Ghana about intra-household decision-making about seeking care for
yellow fever in children showed that in resource-poor settings fathers prioritized between
spending for use of health services or investing in income generating aspects such as the
purchase of agricultural productions.17 The sole decision regarding payment of health
care rested on the father due to traditional roles of earning wages that is associated with
men.
In general, spousal decision-making is shown to affect health-seeking behavior
in other aspects such as family planning and reproductive health. Research aimed at
understanding this has usually assessed men and women’s responses about who takes
decisions, either solely or jointly. Considerable disagreement between spouses is noted
on who takes household decisions. For example, in Bangladesh, couples’ reports on
household decision-making suggested that when couples provided consistent information
about their individual autonomy of decision-making about a particular aspect, it resulted
in higher odds in seeking antenatal care, while discordant answers resulted in lower odds
of care seeking during pregnancy.123 This likely indicates an imbalance in intrahousehold bargaining or poor spousal communication and related decision-making.
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Male autonomy may or may not result in male involvement in health-seeking
activities. For example, in Nepal, a study on pregnant women seeking antenatal care
showed that sole women’s decision-making in a number of household decisions resulted
in low male involvement in antenatal care, while joint decision-making by men and
women resulted in more male involvement.18 Another study in Nepal also found that
agreement between spouses on who makes certain household decision was strongly
associated with health care use related to ANC, institutional delivery, receiving tetanus
toxoid for the pregnant woman, and child immunization as compared to spousal
disagreement or women indicating sole decision-making power.19
Overall evidence suggests that spousal communication, decision-making, and
bargaining is related to health, but virtually no research exists on mechanisms of how
decision-making control relates to child nutrition. With gendered roles in households,
South Asian context of patriarchy, and documented low status of women, it is important
to understand how men and women’s role and decision-making within the household
affects child nutrition for effective nutrition-sensitive interventions.
2.6 Conceptual Model
Our research is guided by Care for Nutrition conceptual framework by Engle et al.
(1999) that describes paths and linkages between basic, underlying, and immediate
determinants of child nutrition, and specifically incorporates the concept of care and
related caring practices which ultimately create an environment that can enable proper
child growth and nutrition.10 One of the resources needed to care for child nutrition
explained in the framework is women’s autonomy, which relates to access economic and
social resources, workload and household decision-making control. In our research, we
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use women’s bargaining power as a resource for care with specific domains that capture:
1) ownership and control of assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload based on time
allocation on productive activities, and 4) household decision-making control.
We conceptualize bargaining power to influence individual-level and householdlevel processes that ultimately influence feeding practices and child nutritional status,
respectively. Intra-household bargaining as a resource for care can affect processes at an
individual level for IYCF practices through the mother as the primary caretaker who
provides food to the child through breastfeeding and complementary feeding. A mother’s
bargaining power can, therefore, enable her to access different channels of
communication and health resources to gain exposure to specific IYCF information
thereby ultimately affecting IYCF practices.
We also conceptualize that bargaining power can influence child nutrition at a
household level by the way of household food security. Food security is dependent on
different individuals in the household including the mother of the child and other male
figures involved in income generation and/or agricultural productivity to contribute to
household food provision, and food quality and quantity, which can ultimately affect
child nutritional status.
In our research, we examine two distinct paths through which bargaining may
relate to infants and young children and preschool-aged children differently. We focus on
the exposure to IYCF information as a mechanism that may relate to IYCF practices
because they are critical in the first two years of life for optimal nutrition and there is a
need for appropriate knowledge about IYCF practices to follow them effectively.8,124 In
the second mechanism we examine child HAZ in children below five years. Lower HAZ
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may reflect the cumulative disadvantage more in children under five years than children
under two years. The path through food insecurity may also more distinctly relate to
children older than two years due to their independence in feeding themselves and
predominant reliance on family foods as opposed to baby-specific foods such as breast
milk or other supplemental semi-solid foods. We examine men’s role in HAZ in this
second path as men are more involved in household food procurement and therefore may
more likely influence HAZ than IYCF practices. We acknowledge that the two paths
studied in this research can likely converge at two possible points: 1) household food
insecurity may influence child dietary diversity,115,125 but those relationships and effects
may be more prominent in the older children, and 2) IYCF practices can relate to child
nutritional status, but cannot be assessed in our research due to cross-sectional nature of
our data.
In the first manuscript, we examine how women’s intra-household bargaining power
relates to exposure to IYCF information, and how that, in turn, relates to IYCF practices.
In the second manuscript, we examine the path from intra-household bargaining power to
food insecurity leading to child nutritional status.
2.7 Specific Aims
1. To understand the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power
and IYCF practices in children 0-23 months
1.1 To examine the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power
with four WHO-recommended IYCF practices (early initiation, exclusive
breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and diet diversity).
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Hypothesis: Women’s bargaining power will be positively associated with
improved IYCF practices.
1.2 To examine if access to IYCF information mediates the relationship between
women’s bargaining power and IYCF practices
Hypothesis: Higher bargaining power will be associated with greater exposure to
IYCF information, which in turn will be associated with improved IYCF
practices.
2. To understand the relationship of women’s and men’s bargaining power with child
nutritional status in children aged 0-59 months
2.1 To describe household decision-making control agreement between women and
men
2.2 To examine the relationship between intra-household bargaining power of women
and men with child nutritional status
Hypothesis: Higher women’s bargaining power will be positively associated with
child nutritional status as compared to men’s bargaining power.
2.3 To test if household food insecurity mediates the relationship between women’s
and men’s bargaining power and child nutritional status
Hypothesis: Household food insecurity will mediate the relationship between
women’s and men’s bargaining power and child nutritional status such that higher
bargaining power for both will reduce household food insecurity which will be
then be associated with better child nutritional status.
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2.8 Significance
Women’s intra-household bargaining is an important issue that can affect care
through IYCF practices. This research contributes to the literature on social determinants
of IYCF practices that has thus far mainly studied factors such as parental education,
socioeconomic status, and access to health care. Our research, therefore, provides a
nuanced understanding of how context-specific women’s intra-household bargaining in
Nepal affects IYCF practices and offers an opportunity to understand if and how different
bargaining domains may relate to the different feeding practices. This can provide
valuable information to devise effective strategies to promote IYCF practices and reduce
child undernutrition.
Understanding men’s role in child nutrition has been increasingly recognized as
an important factor, but there is limited evidence on how men’s bargaining power may
influence child nutrition. Due to the traditionally dominant role of men in South Asia,
men not only affect household economy and resources, but also the status of the women
in the household, both of which can influence child nutrition. Research related to men’s
role is limited to educational attainment or income, while no research has been done on
the men’s intra-household bargaining as compared women. Our research provides an
understanding of gender dynamics related to household decision-making and economic
resources and the relatively understudied social resources, and time allocation for men
and women within households.
The aim of this research was also to understand specific mechanisms through
which the association between bargaining power and child nutrition is likely to occur.
One of the linking mechanisms tested in this research is exposure to IYCF practices.
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Information about appropriate IYCF practices is critical in bringing about behavior
change communication and provision of IYCF information is an important strategy of
behavior change interventions. Bargaining power can improve knowledge by accessing
and utilizing resources such as mass media communications, health care providers, and
community health workers that can provide IYCF information.
The other mechanism we test that links bargaining power and child nutritional
status is food insecurity. Food security as a linking mechanism between intra-household
bargaining and child nutritional status is not studied even if individual relationships
between bargaining power, child nutrition, and food insecurity are examined.
Understanding this linking mechanism provides us with an understanding of the specific
bargaining domains that are significant to this relationship. Studying the food insecurity
mechanism contributes to the overall scientific plausibility of the relationship between
bargaining power and child nutrition, and suggests specific aspects of bargaining power
that could be targeted through intervention strategies. Overall, this research is important
because interdisciplinary interventions will benefit from the information to target
multiple outcomes such as food security, IYCF practices, and child nutritional status.
This is also the first study to examine the relationship between men’s intra-household
bargaining and child nutritional status, which will help to understand household gender
dynamics and the relationship with child nutrition, which has not been previously studied.
Our research expands on bargaining power to include multiple domains of
bargaining. Empowerment studies have mainly been limited to women’s household
decision-making control and/ or education.
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Overall, the results from this study provide a greater understanding of the
gendered perspective of different bargaining domains that affect child nutrition. Findings
from this research can have potential implications for future research and nutrition
program interventions.

34

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN
3.1 Overview
This study used the baseline data collected in 2012 from the Suaahara project, a
multi-sectoral, community-focused project aimed at improving health and nutrition of
women and young children in Nepal. The overall goal of this research was to understand
the relationship of gendered intra-household bargaining power with IYCF practices and
child nutritional status, and identify specific pathways connecting bargaining power and
child nutrition.
3.2 Study Setting
Nepal is a landlocked country between India and China, with high burden of
poverty and history of political tension. The hills, mountains, and terai (plains) are
Nepal’s three agro-ecological zones. Child undernutrition is a major issue in Nepal, with
36% of children under five years being chronically undernourished, despite its significant
overall reduction in the past 20 years.2,126 Health and nutrition in women and children
differ by geographical region and social institutions such as caste and religion. Rural
populations disproportionately bear a high burden of maternal and child undernutrition.126
The data for the current research were from the baseline survey for Suaahara
project, a multi-sectoral intervention program aimed at improving the health and nutrition
status of women and children in Nepal by targeting health behavior, increasing access to
quality health and nutrition resources, and improving coordination between government
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We selected 16 districts: 8 intervention districts where Suaahara will implement programs (the
“intervention” sample) and 8 matched comparison districts (Figure 2.2). In order to collect baseline data
prior to initiation of Suaahara programming and to maximize the opportunity to see impact at endline as
implementation will have occurred for the longest period, we selected phase 1 implementation districts as
the 8 survey intervention districts. Aiming for comparison districts that were as similar as possible to the
intervention districts, we selected 8 districts primarily on the following characteristics: agroecology/topography, human development index ranking; size of land holdings, proportion of total
and non-governmental
stakeholders
nutrition
promoting
strategies.
project and radio
population
under two years
of age, level for
of poverty,
percent
of population
that This
is marginalized,
ownership. The district matching was accomplished in consultation with the Suaahara team, New Era, and
other individuals
and
institutions
affiliated with
Suaahara
or working on Nutrition
health andPlan
nutrition
research in
approach
aligned
with
the Government
of Nepal’s
Multi-sectoral
2013Nepal. In some cases, it was difficult to find a match on all of these indicators and therefore, the closest
eight matching
districts were selected (Table 2.1). The matching exercise was undertaken in consultation
127
2017.
Suaahara
was implemented in rural areas of 16 districts across Nepal (Figure
with a large number of stakeholders knowledgeable about Nepal and documentation of indicators from the
Government of Nepal and development partners such as UNICEF.

3.1).

Figure 2.2: Survey districts

Figure 3.1: Suaahara program districts
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Source: Cunningham et al., 2013
3.3 Sample
The sample for Suaahara was acquired through multistage cluster sampling. For
the first stage, 16 districts were selected across Nepal with intervention and control arms
having eight districts each. Districts were matched for sociodemographic and agroecological characteristics. Eighty Village Development Committees (VDCs) were
selected using probability proportional to size for the second stage with five VDCs per
district. For the third stage, three rural wards were selected from each VDC using
probability proportional to size to get a total of 240 wards. For the last stage, within each
ward, 17 households with children under five years were randomly selected to obtain a
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total sample of 4,080 households. Within each household, one child less than five years
of age was randomly selected as the index child for the survey and if available, one child
having the same biological mother was selected as the non-index child. The mother of the
index child completed the household survey. A separate questionnaire was administered
to the male household head, preferably the father of the index child when available, or
other male member of the household who made major household decisions.127
Table 3.1 Sample size based on specific aims and specific outcomes
Specific
Age Group Sample Size
Applicable Nutrition Indicator
Aims
(months)
1
1

0-5
6-23

384
1402

1
2
2

0-23
0-59
0-59

1787
2166a
1052b

Exclusive breastfeeding
Minimum diet diversity, minimum meal
frequency WAZ
Early initiation
HAZ
HAZ

Note: Actual sample slightly lower for different models based on data available on the four bargaining
domains
a
Sample based on data available for women’s and men’s bargaining domains; includes all male
respondents i.e. father of the index child (spouse of the mother) or another male decision-maker in the
household
b
Sample based only on if male respondent is the father of the index child (spouse of the mother).

The sample for the current research differs according to the specific aims and is
presented in Table 3.1. For aim 1, where the outcome is IYCF practices, the sample
consisted of index children aged 0-23 months. Age range of the sample differed for
specific IYCF practices as follows: 1) 0-5 months for exclusive breastfeeding, 2) 0-23
months for early initiation, and 3) 6-23 months for minimum meal frequency and dietary
diversity. For aim 2, the sample consisted of index children aged 0-59 months. For aims
that have men’s intra-household bargaining as a variable, sample size was based on
bargaining power information available for men and women.
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3.4. Data Collection
Data for the Suaahara baseline survey were collected in 2012. Trained
enumerators collected information on the household surveys. One interview was
conducted with the mother of the index child and another interview was conducted either
with the father of the index child or another male household decision-maker. Information
from the mother was collected on child health and child care, infant and young child
feeding practices, household food security, maternal diet diversity, women’s
empowerment, information access, maternal health, IYCF knowledge, attitude, and
perceptions, water sanitation and hygiene, child and maternal anthropometry, and
hemoglobin measurement. Anthropometric measurements were age-appropriate where
children aged 0-23 months were measured using supine length, while for children aged
24-59 months, standing height was measured in duplicates by trained enumerators using
standardized length boards (ShorrBoard produced by Weight and Measure LLC).127
Interviews with male household decision-makers provided information on household
composition, household economics, social assistance, male empowerment, and
agricultural and land practices.
3.5 Data Management
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) collected the data. For
the purpose of this research, I signed a formal data-sharing agreement with IFPRI to use
the data for this research only. A committee member formerly affiliated with IFPRI
shared the dataset using a password-protected, cloud-based application with the
committee chair and me. The dataset is also stored on the student’s password-protected
laptop hard drive for the data analysis for this research.
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3.6 Measures
The two main outcomes of the study related to child nutrition were IYCF practices for
children 0-23 months and child nutritional status for children 0-59 months.
3.6.1 Outcome Variables
1. Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices (Manuscript 1): Indicators for each of the
practices were based on the WHO guidelines.29 We chose the following four IYCF
practices as they encompass main practices that affect nutrient intake in the first 24
months of life. Early initiation focuses on an important feeding practice right after birth,
exclusive breastfeeding is the recommended practice for the first six months for optimal
nutrition, and minimum meal frequency and dietary diversity captures the quantity and
quality of complementary foods, respectively, required from 6-23 months.
a. Early Initiation: Whether a child aged 0-23 months was put to breast within an
hour after birth.
b. Exclusive breastfeeding for six months: Whether a child aged 0-5 months only
had breast milk in the previous 24 hours of the survey.
c. Minimum meal frequency (MMF): Whether a child 6-23 months received the
required number of semi-solid and solid meals in the previous day. For breastfed
children aged 6-8 months, the minimum number of meals is two, and three meals
for breastfed children aged 9-23 months. Overall, the minimum number of meals
for non-breastfed children aged 6-23 months is three.
d. Dietary diversity: This measures the number of food groups consumed by a child
aged 6-23 month in the previous 24 hours. The specific food groups are: 1) grains,
roots, and tubers; 2) legumes and nuts; 3) dairy products; 4) flesh foods (meat,

39

fish, poultry, and organ meats); 5) eggs; 6) vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables;
and 7) other fruits and vegetables.
2. Child Nutritional Status (Manuscript 2): Standard deviation scores for length/heightfor-age (L/HAZ) based on the WHO growth standards were used.128 LAZ is applicable to
children under 24 months and HAZ is applicable to children 24-59 months.
3.6.2 Key Explanatory Variables
1. Intra-household bargaining power (Manuscripts 1 and 2): This measurement for
women and men was based on access to and control of resources and decision-making
control. Women’s and men’s bargaining power was measured in four ways: 1) ownership
and control of assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decisionmaking control. The variables for the specific domains were constructed as follows:
We used ten household assets to form an additive scale to measure ownership and
control of assets. Ownership and control of assets is commonly used as a proxy for
measuring the economic domain of bargaining power.100,129 To measure control of assets,
we used questions about decisions regarding renting and selling of assets used previously
in studies on women’s empowerment in agriculture.22,23 The ten assets used were: 1)
house and other structures, 2) large consumer durables (e.g., fridge, TV, sofa), 3) small
consumer durables (e.g., radio, cookware), 4) mobile phone, 5) transportation (motorized
or non-motorized), 6) agricultural land, 7) non-agricultural land, 8) non-mechanized farm
equipment, 9) large livestock, and 10) small livestock. If the household had a particular
asset, we first assessed if the respondent solely or jointly owned that specific asset. If a
respondent solely or jointly owned an asset, we also considered if s/he was involved in
sole or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. For each asset, a value
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of 1 was assigned if the respondent solely or jointly owned that asset and was also
involved in sole or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. Since our
study focus was on intra-household bargaining, which relates to the relative
socioeconomic position, we measured sole or joint ownership of assets as opposed to
only sole ownership, which would indicate total autonomy. Values for all assets were
summed to obtain a total score ranging from 0-10.
Social participation for women and men was based on active group membership
in different community-based groups, where the participant regularly attended meetings,
engaged in discussions and/or volunteered. Participation in groups such as agricultural
groups, water user’s, land/forest users’, credit or microfinance, mutual help or insurance
group, trade or business association, civic groups, religious groups, mother’s group or
other women’s groups was measured. A value of 1 was assigned for each group that a
respondent participated. The total number of groups in which the respondent participated
was calculated. This measure is previously used examining women’s empowerment in
agriculture.22,23 Since a majority of those with group membership participated in one
group we created a binary variable to indicate whether or not the respondent participated
in any community group.
Workload domain measured the total time spent by the respondent on work
activities in a 24-hour period. Information was collected on all productive activities
(work/ employment, agriculture activities, domestic work, and care for children/
adults/elders) and personal activities (sleeping and resting, personal care, time spent of
leisure activities, and social and/or religious activities). To determine the workload, total
time spent on domestic work, care for children and elders, wage work or employment,
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and subsistence activities such as farming and livestock, and schoolwork was calculated,
based on the respondent’s previous 24-hour recall. This measure is previously used in
examining women’s empowerment in agriculture index.22,23
Household decision-making control was based on respondent’s sole or joint
household decision-making on household economy, health of the family and self, and
domestic violence and mobility.2,82,130 Since our research focus was on intra-household
bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we measured sole or
joint decision-making as opposed to sole decision-making power. Sole decision-making
implies complete autonomy.100 Decisions in households are usually made with several
family members, and within the Nepali context, joint decision-making or support is more
prevalent and favorable.131 Measuring sole or joint decision-making as opposed to soledecision-making captures that women’s status is related to other individuals within a
household, which influences her bargaining power.131 Understanding if others are
involved in decision-making helps identify potential for program engagement with the
household members that may not only influence women’s bargaining power but also
child nutrition. The eight decisions used to create this measure were: 1) major household
expenditures such as on refrigerator or TV, 2) minor household expenditures such as food
for daily consumption or other household necessities, 3) use of family planning products,
4) respondent’s health and nutrition, 5) children’s healthcare, 6) child feeding, 7) how to
keep from domestic violence, and 8) mobility to go to a relative or friend’s house. Men’s
decision-making did not include items on domestic violence and mobility, therefore only
six items were considered for men’s decision-making. For each joint decision, we also
assessed the extent of decision-making control. The response scale for the extent to which
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the respondent feels s/he can contribute to the joint decision was measured as 1= not at
all, 2= small extent, 3= some extent, 4= to a large extent. For each type of decision, a
person was adequate if s/he was the sole decision-maker, or for joint decision-making, if
the respondent felt s/he can be involved at least to some extent of decision-making. We
then calculated the proportion of a respondent’s involvement in sole or joint decisionmaking. All decisions made in the household were computed for the denominator and a
total of sole or joint decisions made served as the numerator.130 Manuscript 1 only
included women’s bargaining domain variables, while manuscript 2 included men’s and
women’s bargaining domains variables.
2. Exposure to IYCF Information (Manuscript 1): This variable was measured as an
additive scale from 0-8 based on if a mother had heard of eight IYCF practice-related
messages. IYCF messages used were: 1) early initiation, 2) colostrum feeding, 3)
exclusive breastfeeding for first six months, 4) not giving any water or liquids other than
breast milk for the first six months, 5) starting complementary feeding (semi-solid/
mashed foods) at 6 months, 6) feeding eggs, fish, and meat to children older than 6
months, 7) hand washing before feeding, and 8) how to feed a child during illness. Since
the aim of this variable was to capture a mother’s access to IYCF information, an overall
score (range: 0-8) of all messages was considered rather than using one or two specific
messages related to each practice as a predictor for each outcome.
3. Household Food Insecurity (Manuscript 2): Household food insecurity was measured
using the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS).132 The mean HFIAS score
in our sample was skewed towards the lower end of the score range. Using linear
transformation for the scale score would be inappropriate for mediation analysis to
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compute the product of coefficients and determine the related direct and indirect effects.
We, therefore, used the HFIAS prevalence categories as a continuous variable with a
score ranging from 1 (food secure) to 4 (severely food insecure). To ensure our
interpretation and inference of the results would not differ, we first analyzed the
relationship between food insecurity prevalence as a categorical variable and the outcome
child HAZ (Reference category= score 1;β= -0.120, p=0.040 for score 2; β = -0.0783,
p=0.279 for score 3; β =-0.280, p=0.058 for score 4). We then tested the relationship
between food insecurity prevalence as a continuous category and HAZ (β= -0.0507,
p=0.022). Both methods showed an overall negative relationship between food insecurity
and child nutrition. We also separately assessed food insecurity as an outcome using it as
a continuous variable and as a categorical variable using the ordered logit model with
women’s and men’s bargaining domains as the explanatory variables. The interpretation
of the relationship between bargaining domains and food insecurity did not differ using
continuous versus categorical variable. Hence, we used the HFIAS prevalence as a
continuous variable.
4. Covariates (Manuscripts 1 and 2)
We considered certain maternal, child, and socioeconomic characteristics as
potential confounders based on prior evidence suggesting an association with child HAZ,
exposure to IYCF information, food insecurity, and/or bargaining power. For example,
higher maternal education has been shown to be associated with higher HAZ, better food
security, and bargaining power 133,134. Household wealth can affect food and health
resources, which could influence child HAZ. Agro-ecological areas were used to control
for geographic differences in feeding practices. The covariates used in all multivariable
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analyses were child age, child gender, maternal age (years), maternal height
(centimeters), maternal education (years of formal schooling), number of children under
5 years in the household, household wealth (sum of number of small durable assets, large
assets, and agricultural assets), whether the respondent was in the Suaahara intervention
or control group, and agro-ecological zone of the household (Hills, Terai, Mountains).
To account for clustering, we analyzed the variability of outcomes at the district
level and the village development committee (VDC) level separately. We found more
variability at the VDC level than the district level. Based estimates, the VDC level
variability also accounted for the district level variability. We also assessed regression
results using wards (240 clusters) as a random effect. The results from this analysis did
not differ as compared to VDC being treated as random effects. Hence clustering was
VDC level (80 clusters) was used as random effects for all multivariate models and
mediation analysis.
3.7 Analysis Plan: Manuscript 1
Analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were obtained
through proportions or means and standard deviation. Bivariate relationships were
assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, exposure to
IYCF messages, and covariates with the four IYCF practices, separately. Simple logistic
regression was used for bivariate analysis of early initiation, exclusive breastfeeding, and
minimum meal frequency. Simple linear regression was used for dietary diversity.
For multivariable analyses, generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM)
using the gsem command, which allows for binary outcome variables, was used to
estimate the path from each bargaining power domain variable to the exposure to IYCF
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information measure, consequently leading to each of the four IYCF practices. We used
the product-of-coefficients method for the path analysis to test for mediation.135 Using
GSEM, we employed this product-of-coefficients method where two regression models
were analyzed for each IYCF outcome- one model where each IYCF practice was
regressed on the mediator (exposure to IYCF information), main explanatory variables of
bargaining power, and covariates, and another model where the mediator (exposure to
IYCF information) was regressed on the main explanatory bargaining variables and
covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as a product of each bargaining domain
coefficient on the mediator and the mediator coefficient on the outcomes. The coefficient
between each of the bargaining domains and IYCF practices was the direct effect.
We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis.135 First,
we found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the
bargaining domains and exposure to IYCF information. Second, we included potential
covariates in all regression analyses to account for confounding between bargaining
power and exposure to IYCF information, bargaining power and IYCF practices, and
exposure to IYCF information and IYCF practices based on previous evidence.63,134,136
Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no reverse causality
based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women with greater
access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage their position
for better health and nutrition outcomes58,85,86,137 and previous research that highlights
this relationship.82,83,87
Sociodemographic covariates (i.e., child age, child gender, maternal age, height,
and education, number of children five years in a household, household wealth, if the
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respondent was in Suaahara intervention or control group, and agro-ecological area)
were used in all models. Child sickness in the past 15 days due to diarrhea or fever was
included as a covariate for exclusive breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and
dietary diversity, as sickness may influence child food intake. In the mediation analysis,
for the legs of the paths that were significant, the indirect effect was calculated as the
product of the individual coefficients of each leg leading to the mediator and then to the
outcome using the nlcom procedure to obtain appropriate test statistics, standard errors,
and significance levels. All continuous variables were standardized.
3.8 Analysis plan: Manuscript 2
All analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were
obtained through proportions, or means and standard deviation, as relevant to the
variables. Bivariate relationship with child HAZ using simple linear regression was
assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, food insecurity,
and control variables. To describe the household decision-making control between
spouses, we calculated percent agreement and kappa to understand whether there was
agreement on who was involved in specific household decisions. We assessed agreement
on five household decisions: 1) major household expenditure, 2) minor household
expenditure, 3) family planning decisions, 4) decisions regarding child’s health, and 5)
decision regarding child feeding. Agreement was assessed using seven categories: 1)
mother of child solely takes the decision, 2) father of child solely takes the decision, 3)
spouses jointly take the decision, 4) spouses and another person involved in decisionmaking, 5) mother and another person decides, 6) father and another person decides, and
7) only others decide. The sample size for each decision differed because it was based on
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whether or not both men and women had data on a particular decision and if a particular
decision was made in a household. The response categories for persons involved in
decision-making would only allow comparing joint decision between spouses. For
example, if a mother responded that spouse makes a particular decision, she would be
referring to the father of the index child. If a male member who is not the spouse of the
mother responded to a question that spouse makes a particular decision; he would not be
referring to the mother of the index child. Hence, the percent agreement was only
assessed between spouses.
We used multilevel modeling to assess the relationship between HAZ and
women’s bargaining power, men’s bargaining power, women’s and men’s bargaining
power together, and the interaction between women’s and men’s bargaining power to test
if the relationship between women’s bargaining power and HAZ is dependent on men’s
bargaining power.
We used generalized structural equation modeling with household food insecurity
as the mediator. Using GSEM, we employed this product-of-coefficients method where
two regression models were analyzed- one model where child HAZ was regressed on the
mediator (household food insecurity), main explanatory variables of bargaining power for
women and/or men, and covariates, and another model where the mediator (household
food insecurity) was regressed on the main explanatory bargaining variables and
covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as a product of each bargaining domain
coefficient on the mediator and the mediator coefficient on the outcome. The coefficient
between each of the bargaining domains and child HAZ was the direct effect.
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We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis.135 First,
we found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the
women’s bargaining domains and household food insecurity, and except for men’s
workload, there were no significant interactions between men’s bargaining domains and
food insecurity. Based on the interaction estimates, the effect of food insecurity on men’s
average workload was close to zero (-0.049); hence, men’s workload was included in the
mediation analysis. Second, we included potential covariates in all regression analyses to
account for confounding between bargaining power and household food insecurity,
bargaining power and child HAZ, and food security and child HAZ based on previous
evidence.63,134,136 Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no
reverse causality based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women
with greater access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage
their position for better health and nutrition outcomes58,85,86,137 and previous research that
highlights this relationship.82,83,87
In the mediation analysis, for the legs of the paths that were significant, the
indirect effect was calculated as the product of the individual coefficients of each leg
leading to the mediator and then to the outcome using the nlcom procedure to obtain
appropriate test statistics, standard errors, and significance levels. The indirect effect was
compared to the total effect, i.e., the sum of indirect effect and direct effect to assess the
relative contribution of the indirect path. Results are presented as standardized
coefficients for all continuous variables. To understand if there would be any difference
in findings between men’s sample that only included spouses of the mother as compared
to the entire male respondent sample, we also analyzed models with the sample that only
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included bargaining information on the father of the index child, n=1052. The results for
this analysis did not differ from the main analysis and are therefore not presented further,
but specific relevant findings were noted in the discussion section of the manuscript.
3.9 Ethical Approval
Ethical approval for the primary data collection was obtained from the Nepal
Health Research Council and for secondary data analysis was obtained from the
Institutional Review Board of University of South Carolina.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This chapter consists of two manuscripts that relate to the two specific aims of this
dissertation research. Section 4.1 contains the first manuscript titled “Exposure to
nutrition information as a linking mechanism between women’s intra-household
bargaining power and infant and young child feeding practices in rural Nepal.” Section
4.2 contains the second manuscript titled “Examining the relationship between gendered
intra-household bargaining power, household food insecurity, and child nutritional
status in rural Nepal.”
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4.1 MANUSCRIPT 1
Exposure to nutrition information as a linking mechanism between women’s intrahousehold bargaining power and infant and young child feeding practices in rural
Nepal1

1

Kulkarni, S., Frongillo E.A., Cunningham K., Moore S., Blake C.E., To be submitted
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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Women’s intra-household bargaining power is an important determinant of
child nutritional status, but there is limited evidence on how bargaining power relates to
infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices. The objectives of this study were to 1)
understand which domains of bargaining power are associated with different IYCF
practices, and 2) examine if women’s bargaining power is related to exposure to IYCF
information, and if exposure to IYCF information is in turn associated with improved
IYCF practices.
Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data from 2012 of the
multi-sectoral program, Suaahara, in rural Nepal, focusing on households with a mother
and child 0-23 months of age (n=1787). Women’s intra-household bargaining power
consisted of four domains: 1) ownership and control of household assets, 2) social
participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. We used
generalized structural equation modeling to examine if exposure to IYCF information
mediated the relationship between the four bargaining domains and early initiation,
exclusive breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and dietary diversity, separately.
Results: Social participation was positively associated with exposure to IYCF
information, which in turn was related to early initiation and dietary diversity. Household
decision-making control was directly associated with exclusive breastfeeding. No
domains were associated with minimum meal frequency.
Conclusion: Social participation and household decision-making control are potentially
important domains to consider for improving IYCF practices. Exposure to IYCF
information is an important mechanism linking bargaining power and IYCF practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Promotion of appropriate infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices is
important for the reduction of child undernutrition.1–3 Despite a significant decline in the
past two decades, the burden of child undernutrition in Nepal is still high and is coupled
with poor IYCF practices.4–7 According to the 2016 Nepal Demographic and Health
Survey, the prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life was 66%
and early initiation was 55%. The prevalence of minimum diet diversity among children
aged 6-23 months was only 35%.4 Improving IYCF practices is an important priority for
nutrition programs and policies to ensure proper health and nutrition in the first 1000
days of life to prevent short- and long-term adverse human and economic
consequences.8–12
Women’s household status is an important determinant of child nutritional status
13,14

. Women’s status, as reflected in the intra-household bargaining power, refers to the

relative social and economic position of a woman within a household for accessing and
controlling resources, and her decision-making control.15–17 In our research, we
conceptualize women’s intra-household bargaining power, henceforth referred to as
bargaining power, as consisting of four domains: 1) ownership and control of household
assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload- time spent working in a day, and 4)
household decision-making control.18 In our research, we refer to the mothers of the
children when discussing women’s bargaining power. We use women’s bargaining power
as a resource for care, drawing from the Care for Nutrition conceptual framework by
Engle et al. (1999).19 Women’s bargaining power is important for child feeding because
following appropriate IYCF practices requires economic, social, and human capital
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resources. Women’s bargaining power as a resource for care can enable women to access
and be exposed to information, make informed decisions, and follow recommended IYCF
practices.19
One mechanism through which bargaining power is likely to be associated with
feeding practices is by increasing their exposure to IYCF information. Bargaining power
may provide women with economic and social resources, as well as the time to gain
relevant nutrition information, thereby improving access to IYCF information.
Ownership and control of assets may increase health care utilization by having
material resources to access health care or health information. For example, ownership
and control of assets can increase the availability of transportation to access health
resources.20 Assets owned by women may provide greater access to potential
communication channels such as TV, radios, telephones to access social and health
information that provide IYCF messaging.21,22
Social participation through group membership forms a resource for social
capital.23 Social participation can facilitate information and knowledge exchange, which
can improve access to health resources and knowledge networks related to child nutrition,
thus improving IYCF practices.24 Membership in groups explicitly targeting nutritionsensitive information has shown considerable success in improving IYCF practices in
South Asia.25 Evidence from Bangladesh also suggests that group membership positively
relates to improved household dietary diversity,26 which in turn could relate to child
dietary diversity. Women’s bargaining power in the social participation domain may,
therefore, provide opportunities for interaction and health education to increase women’s
exposure to nutrition messages and consequently relate to better IYCF practices.
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Heavy workload and related time constraints may negatively affect maternal
health care utilization such as uptake of ANC services or facility-based delivery, thereby
limiting access to IYCF information.27,28 Time constraints can lead to inadequate care for
young children and potentially influence whether a mother follows recommended IYCF
practices.29–31 Household decision-making is shown to be positively related to health care
utilization including seeking antenatal and postnatal care services,14 and can improve
access and exposure to information, thus influencing IYCF practices.
Improving exposure to IYCF information through different avenues such as mass
media, improved health care utilization, targeted counseling, and peer support are
common strategies used in behavior change interventions for improving IYCF
practices.3,31,32 Studying exposure to IYCF information directly, rather than using a proxy
measure such as availability of information or program participation, is critical as it is a
known factor relating to IYCF practices; information is necessary to increase knowledge
about feeding practices.33,34
Prior studies on women’s bargaining power have mainly focused on child
nutritional status.35,14 Evidence on how bargaining power relates to IYCF practices is
limited.36–38 Studies have either focused on specific aspects of bargaining such as
household decision-making or proxies such as level of education. There is also limited
understanding of how domains such as social participation or workload affect different
IYCF practices. Research is specifically needed to understand if and how individual
domains of women’s bargaining power influence IYCF practices differently and to
identify mechanisms through which this association is linked.35 Explaining the linkage
between the different domains of bargaining power and IYCF practices contributes to
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strengthening the scientific plausibility of this associative relationship. Understanding the
mechanisms through which this relationship may be linked also provides input for
evidence-based nutrition interventions.
The objectives of this study were to 1) understand which domains of bargaining
power are associated with different IYCF practices, and 2) examine if women’s
bargaining power is related to exposure to IYCF information, and if exposure to IYCF
information is in turn associated with improved IYCF practices.
METHODS
Study design and sampling
We conducted a cross-sectional secondary data analysis of the Suaahara
program’s baseline survey from 2012. Suaahara, a multisectoral intervention, aims to
improve the health and nutrition status of women and children in Nepal by increasing
access to quality health and nutrition services, improving health and nutrition behaviors,
and improving coordination between government and non-governmental stakeholders for
nutrition promoting strategies. The program, initially implemented from 2011-2016, is
now in its second-phase (2016-2021) with interventions in 40 of Nepal’s 75 districts.
Ethical approval for the data collection was obtained from the Nepal Health Research
Council and for this secondary data analysis was obtained from the Institutional Review
Board of University of South Carolina.
The sample for the Suaahara survey was acquired through multistage cluster
sampling. For the first stage, 16 districts (8 intervention and 8 matched comparison) were
purposefully selected. A total of 80 Village Development Committees (VDCs) were
selected using probability proportional to size for the second stage with 5 VDCs per
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district. For the third stage, three rural wards were selected from each VDC using
probability proportional to size to get a total of 240 wards. For the last stage, within each
ward, 17 households with children under five years were randomly selected to obtain a
total sample of 4,080 households. Within each household, one child less than five years
of age was randomly selected as the index child for the survey and, if available, one child
having the same biological mother as the index child was selected as the non-index child.
The mother of the index child completed the household survey. Since the outcome
variables for this analysis were IYCF practices, the sample only included data on children
aged 0-23 months (n=1787).
Data collection for the Suaahara baseline survey was conducted in 2012 by
trained enumerators. Information from the mother was collected on child health and child
care, IYCF practices, household food security, maternal diet diversity, women’s
empowerment, information access, maternal health, IYCF knowledge, attitude, and
perceptions, water sanitation and hygiene, child and maternal anthropometry, and
hemoglobin.
Outcome variables
Four World Health Organization (WHO)-recommended IYCF practices were the
outcome variables that capture the main practices to follow from birth to 24 months: 1)
early initiation, 2) exclusive breastfeeding, 3) minimum meal frequency, and 4) dietary
diversity. We chose the following four IYCF practices as they encompass main practices
that affect nutrient intake in the first 24 months of life. Early initiation focuses on an
important feeding practice right after birth, exclusive breastfeeding is the recommended
practice for the first six months for optimal nutrition, and minimum meal frequency and
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dietary diversity captures the quantity and quality of complementary foods, respectively,
required from 6-23 months. Early initiation was coded as a binary variable indicating if a
child aged 0-23 months was put to the breast within an hour after birth. Exclusive
breastfeeding was a binary variable indicating if a child aged 0-5 months only had breast
milk in the previous 24 hours of the survey. Minimum meal frequency was a binary
variable based on whether a child aged 6-23 months received the required number of
semi-solid or solid meals or milk feeds in the previous day. For breastfed children aged 68 months, the minimum number of meals is two, and for breastfed children aged 9-23
months, the minimum number of meals is three. The minimum number of meals for nonbreastfed children aged 6-23 months is four. Dietary diversity was a continuous variable
that measured the consumption of foods among children aged 6-23 months in the 24
hours prior to the survey, with foods grouped into 7 groups: 1) grains, roots, and tubers;
2) legumes and nuts; 3) dairy products; 4) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry, and organ
meats); 5) eggs; 6) vitamin-A-rich fruits and vegetables; and 7) other fruits and
vegetables.
Explanatory Variables
Women’s bargaining power was measured through 4 domains: 1) ownership and
control of household assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household
decision-making control. The variables for the specific domains were constructed as
described below.
We used ten household assets to form an additive scale to measure ownership and
control of assets. The ten assets used were: 1) house and other structures, 2) large
consumer durables (e.g., fridge, TV, sofa), 3) small consumer durables (e.g., radio,
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cookware), 4) mobile phone, 5) transportation (motorized or non-motorized), 6)
agricultural land, 7) non-agricultural land, 8) non-mechanized farm equipment, 9) large
livestock, and 10) small livestock. Based on if the household owned a particular asset, we
first assessed if the respondent solely or jointly owned a specific asset. If a respondent
solely or jointly owned an asset, we also considered if s/he was involved in sole or joint
decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. For each asset, a value of 1 was
assigned if the respondent solely or jointly owned that asset and was also involved in sole
or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset.38,39 Since our study focus is
on intra-household bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we
measured sole or joint ownership of assets as opposed to only sole ownership, which
would indicate total autonomy. Values for all assets were summed to obtain a total score
ranging from 0-10.
Social participation was based on active group membership, where the respondent
regularly attended meetings, participation in discussions, and/or volunteered, in different
community-based groups.38,39 Participation in groups such as agricultural groups, water
user’s, land/forest users’, credit or microfinance, mutual help or insurance group, trade or
business association, civic groups, religious groups, mother’s group or other women’s
groups was measured. A value of 1 was assigned for each group that a respondent
participated. The total number of groups in which the respondent participated was
calculated. As a majority of those with group membership participated in one group, we
created a binary variable to indicate whether or not the respondent participated in any
community group.
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Workload domain measured the total time spent by women on work activities in a
24-hour period.38,39 Information was collected on all productive and personal activities
such as sleeping and resting, personal care, work/ employment, domestic work, care for
children/ adults/elders, time spent of leisure activities, and social and/or religious
activities. To determine the workload, total time spent on domestic work, care for
children and elders, wage work or employment, and subsistence activities such as
farming and livestock, and school work was calculated based on the respondent’s
previous 24-hour recall.
Household decision-making was measured as the proportion of household
decisions in which the respondent had sole or joint decision-making control.40 The eight
decisions used to create this measure were: 1) major household expenditures such as
refrigerator or TV, 2) minor household expenditures such as food for daily consumption
or other household necessities, 3) use of family planning products, 4) respondent’s health
and nutrition, 5) children’s healthcare, 6) child feeding, 7) how to keep from domestic
violence, and 8) mobility to go to a relative or friend’s house. For each joint decision, we
also assessed the extent of decision-making control. The response scale for the extent to
which the respondent feels she can contribute to the joint decision was measured as 1=
not at all, 2= small extent, 3= some extent, 4= to a large extent. For each type of
decision, a person was adequate if she was the sole decision-maker, or for joint decisionmaking, if the respondent felt she can be involved at least to some extent of decisionmaking. To calculate the proportion of women involved in sole or joint decision-making,
all decisions made in the household were computed for the denominator and a total of
sole or joint decisions made served as the numerator.
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Exposure to IYCF information was measured as an additive scale from 0-8 based
on if a mother had heard of eight IYCF practice-related messages. IYCF messages used
were: 1) early initiation, 2) colostrum feeding, 3) exclusive breastfeeding for first six
months, 4) not giving any water or liquids other than breast milk for the first six months,
5) starting complementary feeding (semi-solid/ mashed foods) at 6 months, 6) feeding
eggs, fish, and meat to children older than 6 months, 7) hand washing before feeding, and
8) how to feed a child during illness. Since the aim of this variable was to capture a
mother’s exposure to IYCF information, an overall score (range: 0-8) of all messages was
considered rather than using one or two specific messages related to each practice as a
mediator for each outcome.
We considered certain maternal, child, and socioeconomic characteristics and
geographical factors as potential confounders based on prior evidence suggesting an
association with child feeding practices, exposure to IYCF information, and/or bargaining
power. For example, higher maternal education has been shown to be associated with
improved breastfeeding practices, access to information, and bargaining power.41–43 Child
age is associated with age-specific feeding practices through the first 24 months.
Household wealth can affect food and health resources, which could influence feeding
practices and access to information. Agro-ecological areas were used to control for
geographic differences in access to food and feeding practices. The covariates used in all
multivariable analyses were child age, child gender, maternal age (years), maternal height
(centimeters), maternal education (years of formal schooling), number of children under
5 years in the household, household wealth (sum of number of small durable assets, large
assets, and agricultural assets), if the respondent was in Suaahara intervention or control
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group, and agro-ecological zone of the household (Hills, Terai, Mountains). Child
sickness in the past 15 days due to diarrhea or fever was included as a covariate for
exclusive breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and dietary diversity, as sickness may
influence child food intake. Clustering of observations within the village development
committees (80 clusters) was accounted for using the vce option to get the appropriate
standard errors.
Statistical Analysis
Analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were
obtained through proportions or means and standard deviation. Bivariate relationships
were assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, exposure
to IYCF messages, and covariates with the four IYCF practices, separately. Simple
logistic regression was used for bivariate analysis of early initiation, exclusive
breastfeeding, and minimum meal frequency. Simple linear regression was used for
dietary diversity. Irrespective of the significance value of the findings in bivariate
analysis, all bargaining domain variables were included in multivariable analyses.
Generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) allows for path analysis using
categorical variables. We used the product-of-coefficients method for the path analysis to
test for mediation (Figure 4.1).44 Using GSEM, we employed this product-of-coefficients
method where two regression models were analyzed for each IYCF outcome- one model
where each IYCF practice was regressed on the mediator (exposure to IYCF
information), main explanatory variables of bargaining power, and covariates, and
another model where the mediator (exposure to IYCF information) was regressed on the
main explanatory bargaining variables and covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as
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a product of each bargaining domain coefficient on the mediator and the mediator
coefficient on the outcomes. The coefficient between each of the bargaining domains and
IYCF practices was the direct effect.
We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis.44 First,
we found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the
bargaining domains and exposure to IYCF information. Second, we included potential
covariates in all regression analyses to account for confounding between bargaining
power and exposure to IYCF information, bargaining power and IYCF practices, and
exposure to IYCF information and IYCF practices based on previous evidence.45–47
Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no reverse causality
based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women with greater
access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage their position
for better health and nutrition outcomes48–51 and previous research that highlights this
relationship.35,14,52
A total of four models were analyzed, one for each IYCF outcome. The mediator
in each model was exposure to IYCF information. In mediation analysis, for the legs of
the paths that were significant, the indirect effect was calculated as the product of the
individual coefficients of each leg leading to the mediator and then to the outcome using
the nlcom procedure to obtain appropriate test statistics, standard errors, and significance
levels. All continuous variables were standardized.
RESULTS
The prevalence of appropriate IYCF practices was generally low in the sample.
Early initiation of breastfeeding was reported in 39% of the sample and 49.3% were
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exclusively breastfed, while minimum meal frequency was 72.2% and on average
children consumed foods from three of the seven food groups and nearly 45.6% met the
minimum dietary diversity cut-off of consuming foods from 4 of the 7 food groups (Table
4.1). Women were solely or jointly involved in three-quarters (75.6%) of household
decisions. The mean asset ownership and control score was 2.8. Sixteen percent of the
mothers actively participated in one or more community groups, and on average worked
for 10.9 hours in a day. Mothers had heard about five of the eight IYCF messages.
None of the bargaining domains were significantly associated in bivariate
analyses with early initiation or dietary diversity (Table 4.2). Workload was positively
associated with minimum meal frequency. Household decision-making was positively
associated with exclusively breastfeeding at P-value less than 0.1. Access to IYCF
information was associated with higher odds of early initiation by about 12% and with
higher diet diversity by 0.1 food groups, but was not associated with the other two child
feeding variables.
In the mediation analysis, exposure to IYCF information was positively
associated with early initiation and dietary diversity. Social participation was positively
associated with exposure to IYCF message for all four domains (Table 4.3). Social
participation did not have a direct significant relationship with any of the IYCF
outcomes. Social participation had a significant indirect effect on early initiation at Pvalue less than 0.05 and dietary diversity at P-value less than 0.1.
Ownership and control of assets did not have a significant direct or indirect
relationship with any of the IYCF outcomes. Women’s workload was borderline
significant with exposure to IYCF message for early initiation (p=0.044), but did not
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have a direct relationship with any of the other IYCF outcomes. Household decisionmaking had a significant positive and direct relationship with early initiation and
exclusive breastfeeding, but did not have a significant direct or indirect relationship with
other domains.
DISCUSSION
Our study suggests that social participation is likely to be important for improved
IYCF practices and that exposure to IYCF information may be an important linking
mechanism between bargaining power and IYCF practices. Social participation was
associated with higher exposure to IYCF information that was subsequently associated
with early initiation and dietary diversity. Household decision-making had a direct
positive relationship with exclusive breastfeeding and early initiation. None of the other
domains were significantly related to early initiation and diet diversity, and no significant
direct or indirect relationships were observed with minimum meal frequency.
Social participation was positively associated with exposure to information, which
in turn was associated with early initiation and diet diversity. The association between
social participation and exposure to IYCF knowledge is consistent with findings from
other studies. Group membership in specific nutrition education or mother-to-mother
support groups has shown to have a positive association with maternal information and
knowledge.53,54 For example, participation in a group-based maternal education program
in eastern India improved dietary diversity in children under two years.55 Group-based
approach is increasingly considered as an important strategy to improve maternal and
child nutrition outcomes through multiple social, economic, and agricultural paths.25,56
Evidence also suggests that group membership through targeted nutrition programming
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and relevant messages are most effective in bringing about positive results.25 Our
findings on mediation through exposure to IYCF practices lend empirical evidence to a
possible path of social participation that increases awareness of appropriate IYCF
practices, which is then translated to following the recommended IYCF practices. The
findings from our path analysis may also suggest that increase in social participation may
increase access to multiple health information resources through improved uptake of
services and higher frequency of social interaction to be exposed to the IYCF messages.57
The positive relationship between social participation and exposure to IYCF practices
may also highlight higher mobility in women to access information, which is important
for bargaining power.
Group membership is a part of structural social capital,58 which also includes
network size and characteristics, such as literacy level, or cognitive social capital. While
not available in our dataset, these social capital factors may also play an important role in
child nutrition outcomes.59 For example, cognitive social capital, which captures
dimensions of trust, social harmony, and cohesion, is consistently shown to be associated
with child nutrition.60 Our results on the positive relationship between exposure to IYCF
messages and early initiation and dietary diversity also suggest possible increase in
knowledge that may affect following recommended practices. Gaining knowledge and
improving awareness are cognitive processes that need further investigation to understand
how they may relate to bargaining power and IYCF practices.
Household decision-making was significantly associated with exclusive
breastfeeding and early initiation. This finding is consistent with several studies showing
that increased household decision-making is related to improved IYCF practices. For
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example, with regards to exclusive breastfeeding, financial autonomy was positively
associated with breastfeeding in infants 3-5 months in rural India.37 Mother’s autonomy
in child feeding is shown to be positively associated with exclusive breastfeeding in
Vietnam.61 Our results may likely be driven by the fact that a majority of the mothers
made the household decision-making child health and child feeding, which is especially
critical for exclusive breastfeeding. Household decision-making was significantly related
to exposure to IYCF messages, which suggests that other decisions such as on mobility or
expenditure may also be important to be exposed to relevant information. Exposure to
IYCF messages did not mediate the relationship between household decision-making and
exclusive breastfeeding, which may be related to relatively smaller sample size
insufficient to capture the effect of the relationship.
The lack of a significant relationship between household decision-making with
other IYCF practices suggest that other practices may require support from other
members of the family or community and/or may be dependent on other household
aspects such as food security or access to health care in addition to having decisionmaking control. Prior literature on household decision-making and IYCF practices has
been limited with mixed results for complementary feeding practices. For example,
household decision-making was only significantly related to minimum meal frequency
and minimal acceptable diet in two countries out of 10 countries in a multi-country study
from sub-Saharan Africa.62 Mothers with low involvement in household decision-making
had lower dietary diversity in a review of factors affecting feeding practices in South
Asia, however the effect size was small.63 Women in South Asia have overall low
household decision-making control.64 Material resource constraints for food acquisition
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and preparation may hinder mother’s provision of adequate quantity and quality of food
and have a differential effect on IYCF practices than decision-making. Some of the effect
on feeding practices may also be influenced by other female figures in the household
such as mothers-in-law, therefore, understanding the relative bargaining power of the
mother in comparison to the mother-in-law may provide information on other household
members who can affect child feeding.
Ownership and control of assets was not positively associated with increased
exposure to IYCF information or any of the IYCF practices. This is contrary to
expectation because women with more assets may more likely have higher exposure to
IYCF information, as they may be better able to access resources that provide health
information having access to transportation to seek care and information, possessing
media such as TV, radio, and phone, which can help with improved access to
information.20–22,65–67 Regression analyses to examine the relationship between ownership
and control of individual assets and IYCF information (results not shown) suggested
owning a phone was positively associated with exposure to IYCF information. While
more research is needed to provide empirical evidence on mobile health technology,
IYCF messages, and related practices, studies exploring the relationship between
different forms of media suggest that, given the rapid increase in mobile usage in
developing countries, this avenue should be exploited for access to information.22,68 Our
finding on the relationship of individual assets with IYCF information suggests that more
research is needed to understand and evaluate the trade-offs between using a whole scale
measure versus more specific items that focus on distinct aspects on gaining nutrition
knowledge and improving practices.
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Ownership and control of assets did not have a direct association with any of the
IYCF outcomes. While women’s economic independence may relate to child nutrition,
with regards to IYCF practices, the results have been mixed. For example, in India,
maternal wealth as determined by her employment and household wealth had no
significant positive association with IYCF practices.69 In resource-poor settings, mothers
may prioritize finances to cover costs that affect the whole household or may to choose
quantity of food to satiate hunger over dietary diversity, which may be more cost
prohibitive, thus access to and control of economic resources may not have a large effect
on IYCF practices.
Workload was not significantly associated with IYCF practices. This finding is
contrary to our expectation. Care for children could be compromised when mothers have
a higher workload and more time is allocated to other activities or if children are left
unattended.70 Working mothers may not get enough opportunity to exclusively breastfeed
their child.30,31,71 Time allocation may be contextual and may affect IYCF practices
differently. For example, data from women’s empowerment in agriculture in five
countries suggest that women involved in agricultural activities have greater diet
diversity and that this was related to production diversity.29 Therefore, women spending
more time working for wages or in subsistence agriculture may be able to provide diverse
foods, irrespective of access to information. We also did not find any significant indirect
effect through exposure to IYCF information for workload except for a small effect with
early initiation. Research related to health-seeking behavior or healthcare utilization in
India, Vietnam, and Ethiopia show that heavy workload and time constraints limit a
woman’s ability to seek care.27,71,72 Future research can help our understanding of

70

specific aspects of women’s time allocation for care practices that may relate most to
IYCF practices.
We did not find a significant relationship between all domains and child nutrition,
which highlights that specific bargaining domains may be key in improving practices. For
example, higher household decision-making was directly associated with exclusive
breastfeeding and to a small extent with early initiation. Given a mother’s role as a
primary caregiver, mothers would be expected to be more involved in child feedingrelated decision-making. Lack of a significant finding between the economic domain and
either breastfeeding and early initiation suggests that while women may be better able to
access health resources if they have more economic control, this control and access to
economic resources likely has less effect on breastfeeding feeding behaviors. Conversely,
women’s social participation is more likely to be associated with information to IYCF
information and dietary diversity, which suggests that domains other than decisionmaking control are more important to affect complementary feeding behaviors that
involve interactions or process other than only the mother and the child. No significant
direct relationship between other domains may suggest the need for measures that capture
specific aspects of IYCF practices. For example, information on economic control of
food resources or food expenditure may more precisely capture the relationship between
economic control of resources and dietary diversity. Similarly, measures for assessing
time spent in feeding or food-related practices for the child may be helpful in
understanding the overall workload in relation to child feeding practices.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to have simultaneously examined several
domains of household bargaining and several IYCF practices in South Asia. This study
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provides a comprehensive view of the social, economic, and cultural aspects of household
bargaining power and IYCF practices. Additionally, we focused on testing a possible
mechanism linking bargaining power and IYCF outcomes. Understanding potential
mechanisms is essential for elucidating the nature of relationships between bargaining
power and IYCF practices. Our study shows that certain bargaining domains are related
to accessing IYCF information, thereby highlighting the need for behavior change
interventions to address gender-related barriers in gaining access to IYCF information.
The cross-sectional data do not allow us to make any causal inferences. Owing to
the specific age-range for exclusive breastfeeding, our sample size for this outcome was
small. The data for the different bargaining domains and IYCF practices are selfreported; therefore the possibility of socially biased responses cannot be ruled out,
especially for responses related to household decision-making. For social participation,
availability of measures about network characteristics may have provided a more
nuanced view of its relationship with IYCF information access and IYCF practices.
Future research could focus on specific aspects of the individual domains of
bargaining. For example, cognitive aspects of social capital such as trust, perceived
support, and/or reciprocity could be combined with the structural aspects of participation
and size of the network to understand the relative contribution of each aspect to influence
IYCF practices. Mechanisms linking bargaining power to knowledge or intention of
IYCF practices could be assessed to provide evidence of relationship between bargaining
and cognitive processes such as knowledge and intention, which are shown to be
associated with practices.73 Since exposure to IYCF information could potentially
promote nutrition knowledge and possible practices through more social participation,
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greater investments could be made to improve women’s participation. Combining
nutrition messaging with social participation can help maximize women’s use of social
resources and time to build social capital, offer opportunities to economically contribute
to the household, and improve nutrition knowledge and related-self efficacy.
Interventions could also focus on involving mothers and grandmothers, who are known to
influence feeding habits and are involved in child feeding to participate together in
group-based programs to target multiple members of the household who can support a
mother in following appropriate IYCF practices. Overall, our study highlights that
addressing poor feeding practices will require strengthening women’s bargaining power
and exposure to IYCF information.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of child, maternal, and household characteristics for
children under 24 months and their mothers in Suaahara study in Nepal
Variable
Child Characteristics
Child age (months)
Child gender (female)
Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices
Early initiation (age: 0-23 mo)
Exclusive breastfeeding (age: 0-6 mo)
Minimum meal frequency (age: 6-23 mo)
Minimum dietary diversity (age: 6-23 mo)
Dietary diversity score (age: 6-23 mo)
Maternal Characteristics
Intra-household bargaining domains
Ownership and control of assets
Social participation (%)
Social participation score
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours
Proportion of Household decision-making
Exposure to IYCF information
Maternal age (years)
Maternal height (cm)
Maternal years of schooling
Household Characteristics
Children under 5 years
Household wealth (assets)
Agro-ecological area
Mountain
Hills
Terai

80

N
1787
1787

Mean (SD) or %
12.3 (6.74)
49.3

Range
0-23.9
-

1787
385
1402
1402
1402

39.0
49.3
72.2
45.58
3.33 (1.20)

0-7

1787
1679
1679
1787
1787
1787
1787
1786
1786

2.78 (2.25)
15.72
0.21(0.55)
10.98 (2.98)
75.6 (21.4)
4.82(2.07)
24.9 (5.59)
151.6 (5.50)
5.16 (4.48)

0-9
0-5
0.58-18.9
0-100
0-8
15-52
133.2-179.5
0-15

1787
1787
1787

1.42 (0.62)
5.81 (3.65)

1-5
0-26

25.1
50.6
24.3

Table 4.2: Bivariate associations of child, maternal, and household characteristics with
IYCF practices in children 0-24 months in Suaahara study in Nepal
Variable

Child Characteristics
Child age (months)
Child gender (female)
Maternal Characteristics
Ownership and control of
assets
Social Participation
Workload
Household decisionmaking
Exposure to IYCF
information
Maternal age (years)
Maternal height (cm)
Maternal years of
schooling
Household
Characteristics
Children under 5 years
Household wealth (assets)
Agro-ecological area
Mountain
Hills
Terai

Early
initiation

Exclusive
breastfeeding
N=362
OR
(P-value)

Minimum
meal
frequency
N=1315
OR
(P-value)

N=1677
OR
(P-value)

N=1315
Coefficient
(P-value)

0.996
(P=0.593)

0.491
(P<0.001)

1.044
(P<0.001)

0.0720
(P<0.001)

0.920
(0.402)

1.359
(P=0.146)

1.277
(0.049)

0.0836
(P=0.208)

0.984
(P=0.457)
0.885
(P=0.376)
0.989
(P=0.525)
1.175
(P=0.490)
1.116
(P<0.001)
0.973
(0.004)
1.011
(0.234)
1.028
(0.013)

1.0308
(P=0.523)
1.307
(P=0.378)
0.949
(P=0.108)
2.468
(P=0.076)
1.020
(P=0.720)
0.999
(0.960)
1.046
(P=0.022)
0.965
(P=0.121)

1.004
(P=0.870)
0.976
(P=0.886)
1.046
(P=0.033)
0.951
(P=0.863)
1.005
(P=0.874)
0.990
(P=0.383)
0.996
(P=0.758)
1.020
(P=0.148)

-0.00563
(P=0.702)
0.147
(P=0.102)
0.00991
(P=0.389)
-0.0536
(P=0.730)
0.0968
(p<0.001)
-0.0133
(P=0.030)
0.0109
(P=0.069)
0.0622
(P<0.001)

0.935
(0.412)

1.171
(P=0.296)

0.904
(0.334)

-0.265
(P<0.001)

1.019
(0.179)

0.920
(P=0.005)

0.979
(0.220)

0.0595
(P<0.001)

Ref
1.194
(P=0.146)
1.127
(P=0.408)

Ref
0.979
(P=0.936)
0.426
(P=0.004)

Ref
0.560
(P<0.001)
0.478
(P<0.001)

Ref
0.0622
(P=0.435)
-0.166
(P=0.087)
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Dietary
Diversity

Table 4.3: Individual path coefficients for relationship between the bargaining domains,
exposure to IYCF information, and IYCF outcomes
Early initiation

Exclusive
breastfeeding

N=1677
Model 1

N=362
Model 2

Model 3

N=1315
Model 4

Leg 1 a
Ownership
& control of assets

0.00754
(P=0.845)

-0.0506
(P=0.449)

0.0290
(P=0.467)

0.0290
(P=0.467)

Social
participation

0.266
(P<0.001)

0.390
(P<0.001)

0.214
(P=0.013)

0.214
(P=0.013)

Workload

0.0526
(P=0.044)

0.0476
(P=0.331)

0.0492
(P=0.096)

0.0492
(P=0.096)

Household
decision-making

0.0131
(P=0.710)

0.0783
(P=0.064)

-0.0150
(P=0.699)

-0.0150
(P=0.699)

Leg 2 b
Exposure to IYCF
Information

0.241
(P=0.001)

0.185
(P=0.202)

-0.00754
(P=0.925)

0.0596
(P=0.014)

Direct Effect c
Ownership
& Control of assets

-0.0912
(P=0.300)

-0.172
(P=0.346)

0.0278
(P=0.753)

-0.0205
(P=0.404)

Social
Participation

-0.210
(P=0.209)

0.218
(P=0.572)

-0.197
(P=0.239)

-0.0514
(P=0.466)

Workload

-0.0287
(P=0.611)

0.0205
(P=0.898)

0.0893
(P=0.159)

0.0167
(P=0.478)

Household
decision-making

0.132
(P=0.042)

0.350
(P=0.036)

-0.0105
(P=0.898)

0.0337
(P=0.203)

Indirect
Effect d
Social
Participation

0.0642
(P=0.010)

-

-

0.0128
(P=0.071)

Workload

Minimum Meal
frequency
N=1315

Dietary
Diversity

0.0127
(P=0.080)

a

Leg 1 denotes the relationship between bargaining domains and exposure to IYCF information, the first
leg of the indirect path.
b

Leg 2 denotes the relationship between exposure to IYCF information and IYCF outcomes, the second leg
of the indirect path.
c

Direct effect denotes the direct path from bargaining domains and IYCF outcomes.

d

Total indirect effect calculated for significant paths for leg1 and leg2 and is the product of coefficients of
leg 1 and leg 2
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Bargaining Domains
1. Ownership and control
of assets
2. Social Participation
3. Workload
4. Decision-making
control

Leg 1

Exposure to
IYCF
information
Direct Effect

Leg 2

IYCF Practices
1. Early Initiation
2. Exclusive
Breastfeeding
3. Minimum meal
frequency
4. Dietary
Diversity

Figure 4.1: Path diagram for generalized structural equation modeling
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Examining the relationship between gendered intra-household bargaining power,
household food insecurity, and child nutritional status in rural Nepal2
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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Women’s intra-household bargaining power is an important determinant of
child nutritional status, but more research is needed to understand how men’s bargaining
power individually and together with women’s bargaining power is related to child
nutrition and the mechanisms through which this linkage occurs. The objectives of this
study were to 1) understand how intra-household bargaining of women and men is related
to child height-for-age z-score (HAZ), and 2) if household food insecurity mediates the
relationship between women’s and men’s intra-household bargaining and HAZ because
food insecurity is an important predictor of child nutritional status, and is also shown to
be associated with women’s bargaining power.
Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data from 2012 for an
impact evaluation of the Suaahara program in rural Nepal in 2,166 households with
children aged 0-59 months, their mothers, and their fathers or other male respondents
involved in making major household economic decisions. Intra-household bargaining
power for women and men consisted of four domains: 1) ownership and control of assets,
2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. We used
multilevel modeling to assess the relationship between HAZ and women’s bargaining
power, men’s bargaining power, women’s and men’s bargaining power together, and the
interaction between women’s and men’s bargaining power. Generalized structural
equation modeling was used to test household food insecurity as a mediator.
Results: In the multilevel analysis, women’s workload was negatively associated with
HAZ in the women’s bargaining model and in the combined model of women’s and
men’s bargaining, while men’s social participation was positively associated with HAZ in
the men’s bargaining model and the combined model. No significant interactions were
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found between men’s and women’s bargaining domains suggesting that the relationship
between women’s bargaining and child HAZ was not moderated by men’s bargaining
power. Food insecurity was a partial mediator such that women’s ownership and control
of assets and men’s social participation were negatively associated with food insecurity,
which in turn was negatively associated with child HAZ.
Conclusions: Women’s workload and ownership and control of assets, and men’s social
participation, may be important domains to improve child HAZ. Program strategies could
include comprehensively promoting women’s bargaining power, while also promoting
men’s engagement in nutrition programming.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, Nepal has experienced a significant reduction in the
prevalence of child undernutrition.1,2 This encouraging downward trend, however, still
shows a substantial burden of child undernutrition with 36% of children below five years
being classified as stunted.1 Efforts to reduce child undernutrition are critical because
adverse effects of stunting span across the life course in early childhood development,
schooling outcomes, adult health and nutrition, birth outcomes, productivity, and income
and wages.3–5 Strategies for reducing undernutrition increasingly employ nutritionspecific and nutrition-sensitive interventions that address the socioeconomic and cultural
factors that influence child nutrition including women’s household status.6,7
Women’s status is an important determinant of child nutritional status.8,9
Women’s household status is reflected in intra-household bargaining power, which refers
to the relative social and economic position of a woman within a household.10–12
Bargaining power encompasses two aspects: access to and control of resources, and
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decision-making control.11 An individual’s access to economic resources such as assets
and social resources such as social capital can increase their influence within the
household and improve knowledge and awareness. Higher decision-making control may
indicate greater bargaining to influence health, economic, and social decisions that can
affect self or others.11 In resources poor-settings, time allocation is critical for women as
they are involved in domestic and productive work, thereby creating gendered workload,
which can influence access to and control of other social, economic, and health resources
and may negatively impact bargaining power within the household.13,14
Improved child nutritional status is generally associated with mothers who have
more social and economic resources at their disposal and better decision-making control
in the household.15,9 While there is evidence on the relationship between women’s
bargaining power and child nutrition, two related issues that need greater attention in
research, programs, and policies are: 1) understanding the role of men’s bargaining power
in child nutrition, and 2) identifying the mechanisms linking intra-household bargaining
power and child nutrition.
In South Asia, deeply-rooted patriarchal systems greatly determine the household
power structure and women’s low bargaining power within a household.16,17 Studying
men’s role in intra-household bargaining would provide a comprehensive picture of
household dynamics and its possible influence on child nutrition. To date, literature on
men’s role in child nutrition has mainly focused on father’s education as a determinant or
confounder of child nutritional status or health, and is shown to be associated with
significantly lower odds of stunting, better paternal health knowledge, and improved
health practices such as vitamin A supplementation, use of iodized salt, and child
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immunization.18,19 Greater agreement on who makes household decisions between
spouses has been shown to be associated with better family planning, and maternal and
child health care utilization such as seeking antenatal care.20,21 The above evidence
suggests that men’s bargaining power is related to several predictors of child nutrition
and that men may play an important role in child’s health and related behaviors through
their influence on decisions. Hence, it is essential to understand how men’s bargaining
power relates to child nutritional status. As research and interventions move toward
addressing more distal factors of child nutrition, examining men’s role in child nutrition
is critical in gaining a nuanced understanding on how specific domains of bargaining for
women and men may differentially influence child nutrition
Food insecurity is an important household determinant that is associated with
women’s bargaining power and child nutrition.22 Women’s bargaining power is critical in
ensuring food security as women play a significant role in food production, procurement,
and preparation 6,23. Studies on women’s empowerment in agriculture in Bangladesh and
Nepal demonstrate its positive association with greater maternal and child dietary
diversity.24,25 Women’s bargaining power can also promote more equitable allocation of
economic resources to acquire food within the household for the mother and child,
thereby resulting in better food security.26–28 Consequently, food security can improve
dietary quantity and quality, and may have a positive effect on child nutritional status.
For example, a study in India showed that household food insecurity was associated with
lower child dietary diversity, and that child dietary diversity was a significant predictor of
stunting.29 Elucidating paths between gendered bargaining power and child nutrition
through food insecurity helps to address the current research gap on understanding
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mechanisms through which women’s status operates and relates to child nutrition.15,30
Understanding the linking mechanisms can also suggest key factors that could be
addressed through targeted nutrition interventions.31–34
Prior studies in Nepal on women’s empowerment in agriculture have shown that
specific domains related to workload and leisure, and gender parity in empowerment are
associated child nutritional status. In this paper, we attempt to further the research on
household bargaining power by 1) specifically understanding the relationship of different
domains of men’s bargaining power with child nutritional status including examining
household decision-making control not done in prior studies, and 2) understanding
mechanisms that link women’s and men’s bargaining power with child nutritional status.
The aim of our study was to understand the relationship between gendered intrahousehold bargaining and child nutritional status in rural Nepal. The specific objectives
of this study were to 1) examine how women’s and men’s bargaining power is related to
child HAZ, and 2) assess if household food insecurity mediates the relationship between
women’s and men’s bargaining power and child HAZ.
METHODS
Study design and sampling
We conducted a secondary data analysis of the Suaahara program’s crosssectional baseline dataset, collected by trained enumerators in 2012. Suaahara, a multisectoral intervention, aims to improve the health and nutrition status of women and
children in Nepal by increasing access to quality health and nutrition services, improving
health and nutrition behaviors, and improving coordination between government and
non-governmental stakeholders for nutrition promoting strategies. The program, initially
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implemented from 2011-2016, is now in its second-phase (2016-2021) with interventions
in 42 of Nepal’s 77 districts. Ethical approval for data collection was obtained from the
Nepal Health Research Council and for this secondary data analysis was obtained from
the Institutional Review Board of University of South Carolina.
The sample for the Suaahara survey was acquired through multistage cluster
sampling. For the first stage, 16 districts (8 intervention and 8 matched comparison) were
purposefully selected. A total of 80 Village Development Committees (VDCs) were
selected using probability proportional to size for the second stage with 5 VDCs per
district. For the third stage, three rural wards were selected from each VDC using
probability proportional to size to get a total of 240 wards. For the last stage, within each
ward, 17 households with children under five years were randomly selected to obtain a
total sample of 4,080 households. Within each household, one child less than five years
of age was randomly selected as the index child for the survey and, if available, one child
having the same biological mother as the index child was selected as the non-index child.
Interviews were conducted with the mother of the index child and with the father
of the index child or when unavailable, another male household decision-maker or a
female, if no males resided in the household. In this study, our sample consisted of
households who had complete information on women’s and men’s bargaining domains
(n=2,166) for children aged 0-59 months. Out of this sample, 1052 households had the
father of the index child as the male respondent. Information was collected on child
health and care, infant and young child feeding knowledge and practices, household food
security, maternal diet diversity, women’s empowerment, men’s empowerment,
information access, maternal health, water sanitation and hygiene, and child and maternal
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anthropometry and hemoglobin. Anthropometric measurements were age-appropriate
with children aged 0-23 months measured using supine length, while for children aged
24-59 months standing height was measured in duplicates by trained enumerators using
standardized length boards (ShorrBoard produced by Weight and Measure LLC).35
Outcome Variables
Child height-for-age standard deviation z-scores (HAZ) based on the World
Health Organization (WHO) growth standards were used.36
Explanatory Variables
Women’s bargaining power was measured in four ways: 1) ownership and control
of household assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decisionmaking control. The variables for the specific domains were constructed as follows:
We used ten household assets to form an additive scale to measure ownership and
control of assets. The ten assets used were: 1) house and other structures, 2) large
consumer durables (e.g., fridge, TV, sofa), 3) small consumer durables (e.g., radio,
cookware), 4) mobile phone, 5) transportation (motorized or non-motorized), 6)
agricultural land, 7) non-agricultural land, 8) non-mechanized farm equipment, 9) large
livestock, and 10) small livestock. If the household had a particular asset, we first
assessed if the respondent solely or jointly owned that specific asset. If a respondent
solely or jointly owned an asset, we also considered if s/he was involved in sole or joint
decision-making about selling or renting of that asset.25,37 For each asset, a value of 1 was
assigned if the respondent solely or jointly owned that asset and was also involved in sole
or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. Since our study focus is on
intra-household bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we

91

measured sole or joint ownership of assets as opposed to only sole ownership, which
would indicate total autonomy. Values for all assets were summed to obtain a total score
ranging from 0-10.
Social participation for women and men was based on active group membership
in different community-based groups, where the participant regularly attended meetings,
engaged in discussions and/or volunteered.25,37 Participation in groups such as
agricultural groups, water user’s, land/forest users’, credit or microfinance, mutual help
or insurance group, trade or business association, civic groups, religious groups, mother’s
group or other women’s groups was measured. A value of 1 was assigned for each group
that a respondent participated. The total number of groups in which the respondent
participated was calculated. As a majority of those with group membership participated
in one group, we created a binary variable to indicate whether or not the respondent
participated in any community group.
Workload domain measured the total time spent by the respondent on work
activities in a 24-hour period.25,37 Information was collected on all productive activities
(work/ employment, agriculture activities, domestic work, and care for children/
adults/elders) and personal activities (sleeping and resting, personal care, time spent of
leisure activities, and social and/or religious activities). To determine the workload
measure, total time spent on domestic work, care for children and elders, wage work or
employment, and subsistence activities such as farming and livestock, and schoolwork
was calculated, based on the respondent’s previous 24-hour recall.
Household decision-making control was measured based on respondent’s sole or
joint household decision-making on household economy, health of the family and self,
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and domestic violence and mobility.38 Since our focus was on intra-household
bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we measured sole or
joint decision-making as opposed to sole decision-making power, which would indicate
total autonomy. The eight decisions used to create this measure were: 1) major household
expenditures such as on refrigerator or TV, 2) minor household expenditures such as food
for daily consumption or other household necessities, 3) use of family planning products,
4) respondent’s health and nutrition, 5) children’s healthcare, 6) child feeding, 7) how to
keep from domestic violence, and 8) mobility to go to a relative or friend’s house. Men’s
decision-making did not include items on domestic violence and mobility, therefore only
six items were considered for men’s decision-making. For each joint decision, we also
assessed the extent of decision-making control. The response scale for the extent to which
the respondent feels s/he can contribute to the joint decision was measured as 1= not at
all, 2= small extent, 3= some extent, 4= to a large extent. For each type of decision, a
person was adequate if s/he was the sole decision-maker, or for joint decision-making, if
the respondent felt s/he can be involved at least to some extent of decision-making. We
then calculated the proportion of a respondent’s involvement in sole or joint decisionmaking. All decisions made in the household were computed for the denominator and a
total of sole or joint decisions made served as the numerator.
Household food insecurity was measured using the Household Food Insecurity
Access Scale (HFIAS).39 The mean HFIAS score in our sample was skewed towards the
lower end of the score range. Using linear transformation for the scale score would be
inappropriate for mediation analysis to compute the product of coefficients and determine
the related direct and indirect effects. We, therefore, used the HFIAS prevalence

93

categories as a continuous variable with a score ranging from 1 (food secure) to 4
(severely food insecure). To ensure our interpretation and inference of the results would
not differ, we first analyzed the relationship between food insecurity prevalence as a
categorical variable and the outcome child HAZ (Reference category 1;β= -0.120,
p=0.040 for score 2; β = -0.0783, p=0.279 for score 3; β =-0.280, p=0.058 for score 4).
We then tested the relationship between food insecurity prevalence as a continuous
category and HAZ (β= -0.0507, p=0.022). Both methods showed an overall negative
relationship between food insecurity and child nutrition. We also separately assessed food
insecurity as a continuous outcome variable and as a categorical variable using the
ordered logit model with women’s and men’s bargaining domains as the explanatory
variables. The interpretation of the relationship between bargaining domains and food
insecurity did not differ using continuous versus categorical variable. Hence, we used the
HFIAS prevalence as a continuous variable.
We considered certain maternal, child, and socioeconomic characteristics as
potential confounders based on prior evidence suggesting an association with child HAZ,
food insecurity, and/or bargaining power. For example, higher maternal education has
been shown to be associated with higher HAZ, better food security, and bargaining
power.40,41 Household wealth can affect food and health resources, which could influence
child HAZ. Agro-ecological areas were used to control for geographic differences in
feeding practices and other cultural practices. The covariates used in all multivariable
analyses were child age (months), child gender, maternal age (years), maternal height
(centimeters), maternal education (years of formal schooling), number of children under
5 years living in the household, household wealth (sum of number of small durable
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assets, large assets, and agricultural assets), if the respondent was in Suaahara control or
intervention group, and agro-ecological zone of the household (terai, hills, mountains). In
all analyses, we accounted for village development committee level clustering (80
clusters) as random effects.
Statistical Analysis
All analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were
obtained through proportions, or means and standard deviation, as relevant to the
variables. Bivariate relationship with child HAZ using simple linear regression was
assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, food insecurity,
and control variables. To describe the household decision-making control between
spouses, we calculated percent agreement and kappa to understand whether there was
agreement on who made specific household decisions. We assessed agreement on five
household decisions: 1) major household expenditure, 2) minor household expenditure, 3)
family planning decisions, 4) decisions regarding child’s health, and 5) decision
regarding child feeding. Agreement was assessed using seven categories: 1) mother of
child solely takes the decision, 2) father of child solely takes the decision, 3) spouses
jointly take the decision, 4) spouses and another person involved in decision-making, 5)
mother and another person decides, 6) father and another person decides, and 7) only
others decide. The sample size for each decision differed as it was based on whether or
not both men and women had data on a particular decision and if a particular decision
was made in a household. The response categories for persons involved in decisionmaking would only allow comparing joint decision between spouses. For example, if a
mother responded that spouse makes a particular decision, she would be referring to the
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father of the index child. If a male member who is not the spouse of the mother
responded to a question that spouse makes a particular decision; he would not be
referring to the mother of the index child. Hence, the percent agreement was only
assessed between spouses.
We used multilevel modeling to assess the relationship between HAZ and
women’s bargaining power, men’s bargaining power, women’s and men’s bargaining
power together, and the interaction between women’s and men’s bargaining power to test
if the relationship between women’s bargaining power and HAZ is dependent on men’s
bargaining power. We used generalized structural equation (GSEM) modeling with
household food insecurity as the mediator (Figure 4.2). Using GSEM, we employed this
product-of-coefficients method where two regression models were analyzed- one model
where child HAZ was regressed on the mediator (household food insecurity), main
explanatory variables of bargaining power for women and/or men, and covariates, and
another model where the mediator (household food insecurity) was regressed on the main
explanatory bargaining variables and covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as a
product of each bargaining domain coefficient on the mediator and the mediator
coefficient on the outcome. The coefficient between each of the bargaining domains and
child HAZ was the direct effect.
We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis. First, we
found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the
women’s bargaining domains and household food insecurity, and except for men’s
workload, there were no significant interactions between men’s bargaining domains and
food insecurity. Based on the interaction estimates, the effect of food insecurity on men’s
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average workload was close to zero (-0.049); hence, men’s workload was included in the
mediation analysis. Second, we included potential covariates in all regression analyses to
account for confounding between bargaining power and household food insecurity,
bargaining power and child HAZ, and food insecurity and child HAZ based on previous
evidence.42,41,43 Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no
reverse causality based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women
with greater access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage
their position for better health and nutrition outcomes17,44–46 and previous research that
highlights this relationship.15,9,8
In the mediation analysis, for the legs of the paths that were significant, the
indirect effect was calculated as the product of the individual coefficients of each leg
leading to the mediator and then to the outcome using the nlcom procedure to obtain
appropriate test statistics, standard errors, and significance levels. The indirect effect was
compared to the total effect, i.e., the sum of indirect effect and direct effect to assess the
relative contribution of the indirect path. All continuous variables were standardized. To
understand if there would be any difference in findings between men’s sample that only
included the spouse of the mother as compared to the entire male respondent sample, we
also analyzed models with the sample that only included bargaining information on the
father of the index child, n=1052. The results for this analysis did not differ from the
main analysis and are therefore not presented further, but specific relevant findings are
noted in the discussion section.
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RESULTS
The mean child HAZ score was -1.71 (Table 4.4). Women’s mean asset
ownership and control score was 2.56, while for men it was 5.32. About 17% of women
and men actively participated in at least one community group. Women solely or jointly
participated in 74% of the eight household decisions while men solely or jointly
participated in about 70% of the six household decisions. Women’s mean time allocation
for work was 11.1 hour in a day, while men worked 8.20 hours in a day.
Bivariate analysis showed that women’s asset ownership and control slightly
above significance level (0.056) and was positively associated with HAZ, while
household decision-making control and workload were significantly associated with
lower HAZ (Table 4.5). Bivariate relationship between women’s social participation and
child HAZ was not significant. Men’s ownership and control of assets was not associated
with HAZ. Men’s social participation was associated with significantly higher HAZ,
while household decision-making had a significant negative association with HAZ.
Men’s workload and child HAZ did not have a significant association.
Agreement between spouses on who makes household decisions was generally
low as indicated by low percent agreement and related kappa (Table 4.6). Percent
agreement between spouses was lowest for decisions regarding child health and highest
for major household expenditure. Only 33.87% of the couples agreed on their sole or
joint role in child health decision-making while 51.06% agreed on their decision-making
control about major household expenditures.
We used four models for the multi-level regression analysis to explain the
association of men’s and women’s bargaining power and child HAZ (Table 4.7). In
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model 1, which tested for relationships between the four domains of women’s bargaining
power and HAZ, one standard deviation (SD) higher workload was significantly
associated with 0.05 SD lower HAZ. Women’s ownership and control of assets was not
significantly associated with HAZ, while household decision-making was negatively
related to HAZ with P-value slightly above significance level (P=0.058). In model 2,
which tested for relationships between the same domains of men’s bargaining power and
HAZ, higher workload and ownership and control of assets were not significantly
associated with HAZ. However, men’s social participation was associated with 0.155 SD
higher HAZ and household decision-making was associated with 0.039 lower HAZ
(P=0.066). In model 3, the relationship between men and women’s bargaining power
together and child HAZ was tested. Women’s ownership and control of assets was
positively associated with child HAZ, while workload was negatively related to child
HAZ. Men’s social participation was positively associated with child HAZ. Women’s
and men’s household decision-making control was negatively associated child HAZ, but
at P-value less than 0.1. There were no significant interactions between any of the men’s
and women’s bargaining domains (model 4) indicating that the relationship between
maternal bargaining power and child HAZ was not moderated by men’s bargaining
power.
Results from mediation analysis are presented in Table 4.8. Model 5 represents
testing food insecurity as a mediator between women’s bargaining domains and HAZ.
Women’s ownership and control assets had a significant, positive, direct effect on child
HAZ. Ownership and control of assets was also associated with lower food insecurity
(leg 1, model 5), and in turn, food insecurity was negatively associated with child HAZ
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(leg 2, model 5). This indirect path contributed to 5.92% of the total effect (Table 4.9).
Women’s workload had a direct, negative relationship, but food insecurity did not
mediate the relationship between workload and HAZ. Household decision-making had a
borderline significant (P=0.071) direct negative relationship with child HAZ. Food
insecurity mediated the relationship between household decision-making and child HAZ
such that household decision-making was positively associated with food insecurity,
which in turn was negatively associated with child HAZ, and contributed to 7.76% of the
total effect (Table 4.9). Women’s social participation did not have a direct or indirect
relationship with child HAZ.
Model 6 presents the path analysis between men’s bargaining power and child
HAZ. Men’s social participation was associated lower food insecurity (leg 1, model 6),
which was subsequently negatively related to HAZ (leg 2, model 6); this indirect path
accounted for 4.15% of the total effect. Other domains did not have a direct or indirect
significant relationship with HAZ or food insecurity.
Model 7 shows the results for testing food insecurity as a mediator with women’s
and men’s bargaining domains together. Women’s asset ownership and control was
significantly associated with lower food insecurity, which in turn associated with lower
child HAZ. This relationship mediated 3.88% of the total effect. Ownership of assets and
control also had a significant direct relationship with child HAZ. Women’s decisionmaking control was positively associated with food insecurity, which in turn was
negatively associated with HAZ, accounting for 7.71% of the total effect. Men’s social
participation also had a significant and positive direct relationship with child HAZ.
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In model 7, men’s social participation was negatively associated with food insecurity,
which, in turn, was negatively related to child HAZ, accounting for 3.71% of the total
effect.
DISCUSSION
We examined the men’s and women’s bargaining domains with child nutritional
status and found that distinct domains of men’s and women’s bargaining relate to child
nutritional status and mediate the relationship through food insecurity. Women’s
ownership and control of asset had a positive relationship and workload had a negative
relationship with child HAZ. Food insecurity mediated the relationship between women’s
ownership and control of assets. Men’s social participation was related to higher HAZ
score and food insecurity mediated this relationship.
The positive relationship between women’s ownership and asset control suggests
the importance of women’s economic control, which is consistent with the research
examining bargaining power and child nutrition.26,47,48 Women’s bargaining power
through her assets is related to food allocation among adults.40 Higher access to food may
therefore also translate to better food allocation in terms of acquisition, dietary quantity,
and quality for the child. Women’s ownership and control of assets may indicate better
resource allocation within the household and is also shown to be related to greater
expenditure on child well-being such as health and schooling 10,28,46, thereby likely
affecting the long-term nutritional status of children. Men’s ownership and control of
assets was not related to child nutrition directly or through food insecurity. In the South
Asian context, men are more likely to own and control household assets than women. A
non-significant finding may suggest the use of asset ownership and control for other
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varied purposes in the household, which may not directly relate to child nutrition. The
difference in findings between women’s economic control as compared to men’s
economic control further highlights that women’s individual access to resources is critical
regardless of the husband’s economic control and household wealth as it underscores that
women as compared to men may likely allocate more of their resources to child health
and nutrition.
For the mediation analysis, in models with men’s bargaining power for only the
spouse sample, i.e., index child’s father (results not shown), men’s asset ownership had a
significant negative association with food insecurity, but food insecurity, though
negatively related, was not significantly associated with HAZ. The difference in the
results between the all-male sample and male ‘spouse only’ sample suggests that the
father of index children may be a more productive household member for income
generation or agricultural production affecting food insecurity as compared to other male
members of the household, especially older men, who may not be as actively involved in
income generation. The insignificant findings between food insecurity and HAZ in
‘spouse only’ analysis suggest the effect was likely not captured due to the reduction in
overall sample size of the model from 2,164 for all male models versus 1,052 for ‘spouse
only’ models.
Women’s workload was associated with lower HAZ in our sample. Prior studies
on women’s workload have often focused on outside employment and have shown that it
is negatively related to HAZ.49 Women’s satisfaction with their available leisure time is
shown to be positively associated with length-for-age z-scores in Nepal.25 Women’s
workload influences the time she has available to spend with her child and the quality of
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child care she can provide, which may be reflected in poor feeding, hygiene practices,
and care practices which could, in turn, affect child nutritional status.13,50 Negative
association between workload and HAZ also emphasizes the burden of time poverty
where women in resource-poor settings disproportionately bear the weight of domestic
work and being involved in productive markets to make ends meet. To understand how
the relationship between women’s workload and child HAZ may differ based on early
childhood and preschool years, we also analyzed the relationship in children 0-23 months
and 24-59 months separately (results not shown). Workload was not significantly related
to children aged 0-23 months, but was negatively associated in children aged 24-59
months. Women may face excess workload burden during sensitive phases such as
pregnancy and lactation 51,52, causing distress 53, which could adversely affect child
growth in-utero and during early childhood, leading to poor long-term nutritional status
and may be more prominently reflected in children 3-5 years with lower HAZ due to
cumulative disadvantage. Men’s workload was not significantly related to HAZ, which
suggests that women’s workload may contribute more to HAZ than men’s workload
possibly due to the traditional role of women in caring for children, thus also highlighting
the gendered structure of women’s time allocation.50 Further examination is needed to
understand specific aspects of time allocation and workload to identify where the biggest
tradeoffs are between work and child care to gain a greater understanding of the workload
domain.
Men’s social participation, i.e. active group membership, was a significant
predictor of child HAZ and was also related to household food insecurity. While there is
limited information on understanding the mechanism of how the characteristics of social
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networks may relate to health in men, networks may facilitate greater access to new
knowledge and skills, which could improve health and nutrition outcomes. For example,
a study in India found that men’s social capital, as measured by the size of the network,
was positively related to women attending antenatal care services.54 Involvement in social
groups may also present more opportunities to participate in income generating activities
such as cash-based incentives or through improved agricultural practices, which can
reduce household financial burden, improve food security, and increase child HAZ.55,56
The positive association between men’s social participation and child HAZ was also seen
in the ‘spouse only’ model. Men’s bargaining power in child nutrition is understudied,
and our findings suggest that more research is needed to examine and evaluate structural
and cognitive social capital and social support to elucidate how men’s social domains of
bargaining affect child nutritional status.
Women’s social participation was not associated directly or indirectly with HAZ.
Women’s group participation has been shown to be related to child nutrition outcomes
through multiple mechanisms such as increasing income and improving agricultural
practices to promote increased food production diversity, thereby contributing to
improved food security.57 Prior studies also suggest that linkages from women’s social
participation to child nutrition may be more complex and possibly dependent on different
facets of social capital and social support than just social participation.58,59 Networks
characteristics such as the size of the network or education of the network members may
be more important for predicting child nutrition than participation alone.59 Characteristics
of women-based organizations such as collective maturity of the participants and their
ability over-time to make decisions as a collective entity is related to reduction in the
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prevalence of stunting60, which suggests that rigorous longitudinal evaluation would
serve well to expound the relationship between women’s social participation and child
HAZ, by accounting for the consistency and duration of social participation, generation
of social capital, and concurrently understanding the process of empowerment.
The positive relationship between household decision-making for women with
food insecurity and direct negative relationship with child HAZ were unexpected
findings. With a few exceptions, empowerment literature generally suggests that
women’s decision-making is positively associated with child nutritional status.9,15,61,62
Our unexpected results may perhaps be related to the significant disagreement about
decision-making between spouses in our sample. This disagreement may be a result of
socially desirable responses to highlight higher personal bargaining power than the
spouse. We analyzed if disagreement on individual household decisions between spouses
on who makes the decisions was associated with overall decision-making control (results
not shown). We found that disagreement in decisions related to expenditure was
associated with higher decision-making control in women, while disagreement in child
health and feeding decisions was associated with higher decision-making control in men.
This suggests that women and men may overestimate their role in decision-making in
different aspects, which may not reflect their true decision-making control. The
unexpected findings between food insecurity and household decision-making may be
related to the differential estimation of decision-making control in women and men.
Disagreement can also result from differential personal cognition and interpretation of
questions between men and women.63 We could not assess how responses may differ
between spouses and other influential men in the household due to the way responses
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categories were set-up. Understanding how other influential household males may
respond to questions related to household decision-making in comparison to the mother
of the child would provide further insights into the dynamics of gendered intra-household
bargaining. It is also likely that household decision-making may be more immediately
associated with relative proximal factors such as health-seeking behavior, rather than
HAZ, a measure of chronic undernutrition. Future research is needed to understand any
contextual factors, which may influence women’s decision-making control and its effects
on child HAZ.
In our sample, the relationship between women’s bargaining power and child
nutrition was not moderated by men’s bargaining power. These findings suggest that
despite the patriarchal context in South Asia, women’s bargaining power domains may
operate independently from men’s bargaining power for child HAZ. Lack of a
moderating effect by men’s bargaining power also highlights the importance of women’s
bargaining power in child health and nutrition in terms of individual resource allocation
and decision-making as being crucial regardless of poverty or the gendered social
context.
Our study is one of the first that has compared women’s and men’s bargaining
domains and assessed its relationship to child nutritional status. Our study adds to the
current evidence on men’s role on child nutrition that has focused either on interventions
involving only men or only examined couples’ decision-making in other health topics
such as family planning and health-seeking behavior.64,65 Analysis on women’s
empowerment in agriculture analysis conducted on the Suaahara study sample showed
overall gender disparities in empowerment in agriculture negatively relate to child
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HAZ.25,37 Our study adds to this existing research by providing further in-depth
understanding of the specific bargaining domains including household decision-making
for women and men that are likely to be important for child nutrition. We also examined
food security as a mechanism of how bargaining relates to HAZ. Understanding the role
of food insecurity and how that relates to women’s status and child nutrition is crucial to
inform nutrition-sensitive strategies focusing on gender, nutrition, and agriculture.
The cross-sectional nature of our analysis does not allow us to make causal
inferences. High disagreement between spouses on who makes household decisions may
suggest that social desirability or differences in cognition between women and men about
decision-making related questions may have affected their responses. We did not have
information on domestic violence experiences of women, which is shown to be a
predictor of food insecurity and child nutrition, and is an important domain of household
bargaining.66,67 Future studies should consider including this domain along with other
domains to assess women’s bargaining and its relationship with child nutrition.
Our study has several future research and program implications. Our analysis
shows that men’s role in the household is important and future studies should evaluate
how men’s bargaining power influences child nutrition in varied contexts to enhance our
understanding of household dynamics and child nutrition, to develop a strong evidence
base, and to inform programs and interventions. Studies should also focus on
understanding other social domains such as social capital or social support, and its effect
on child nutrition. Intervention strategies incorporating men’s social participation can be
designed to actively engage men in improving their knowledge, thereby improving their
capacity to provide support to their wives during pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation to
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positively contribute to improving child nutrition efforts. Considering that men’s social
participation was significant for food insecurity, poverty alleviation and health programs
could be designed to include men and women to increase men’s engagement with health
and nutrition issues. Investments should be made in programs that can combine social
participation and greater access to economic resources to effectively target different
domains of women’s bargaining power simultaneously. Microcredit programs have found
success in this regard, but future programs could be more tailored toward a particular
context and could involve other members of the household. Programs can be tailored to
make women and men important stakeholders in improving not only child nutrition, but
also in promoting a holistic, enabling environment for better child care and nutrition.
Nutrition-sensitive approaches focusing on improving women’s social and
economic empowerment may prove beneficial in improving household food security and
child health. More context-specific strategies could be applied to improve asset
ownership and improve women’s participation in income generating activities. Since
women’s status is determined by the sociocultural context, efforts should also be made to
address underlying issues such as low rates of education and poor adolescent health to
empower women before marriage and childbearing. Gendered intra-household bargaining
plays an important role in determining child nutrition, therefore, interventions should
focus on engaging men and women of the household with context-specific, innovative
strategies to reduce child undernutrition.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of child, family, and household characteristics for
children aged 0-59 months in Suaahara study in Nepal, (n=2,166)1
Variable
Child Characteristics
Child age (months)
Child gender (female)
Child HAZ
Women’s Intra-household Bargaining
Domains
Ownership and control of assets
Social participation (active group
membership score)
Social participation (active group
membership yes/no)
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours
Proportion of household decision-making
Men’s Intra-household Bargaining Domains
Ownership and control of assets
Social participation (active group
membership score)
Social participation (active group
membership yes/no)
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours
Proportion of household decision-making
Maternal age (years)
Maternal height (cm)
Maternal years of schooling
Household Characteristics
Household food insecurity
Food secure
Mildly food insecure
Moderately food insecure
Severely food insecure
Children under 5 years
Household wealth (assets)
Agro-ecological area
Mountain
Hills
Terai
1

Mean (SD) or
%

Range

27.1 (16.61)
46.72
-1.71 (1.25)

0-59.99
-5, - 4

2.56 (2.14)
0.23 (0.61)

0-9
0-7

16.62

-

11.1 (3.03)
73.9 (20.8)

0-100

5.32 (2.31)
0.247 (0.64)

0-10
0-5

16.81

-

8.20 (3.95)
69.5 (24.86)
26.72 (6.24)
151.7 (5.64)
4.61 (4.49)

0-100
15-52
133-186.1
0-15

74.56
15.24
8.40
1.80
1.38 (0.62)
6.18 (3.75)

1-5
0-23

27.29
44.37
28.35

-

Sample size is based on bargaining power data available on all domains for women and men
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Table 4.5: Bivariate associations of child, family, and household characteristics with
child HAZ in children 0-59 months in Suaahara study in Nepal, (n=2,166)
Variable
Child Characteristics
Child age (years)
Child gender (female)
Women’s Intra-household Bargaining
Domains
Ownership and control of assets
Social participation (active group
membership yes/no)
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours
Proportion of Household decision-making
Men’s Intra-household Bargaining Domains
Ownership and control of assets
Social participation (active group
membership yes/no)
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours
Proportion of Household decision-making
Maternal Characteristics
Maternal age (years)
Maternal height (cm)
Maternal years of schooling
Household Characteristics
Household Food Insecurity
Food Secure
Mildly food insecure
Moderately food insecure
Severely Food insecure
Children under 5 years
Household wealth (assets)
Agro-ecological area
Mountain
Hills
Terai
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Child HAZ

p-value

-0.0218
0.0885

<0.001
0.100

0.0240
0.00614

0.056
0.932

-0.0422
-0.390

<0.001
0.003

-0.0122
0.324

0.290
<0.001

0.00838
-0.343

0.217
0.001

-0.0229
0.0571
.0570671
0.0693

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Reference
-0.372
-0.512
-0.716
-0.161
0.0670
.0669708

<0.001
<0.001
<0.
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

0.485
0.478

<0.001
<0.001

Table 4.6: Agreement on household decision-making between spouses
Decision

Percent
Agreement
51.06
42.00
50.38
33.87

Kappa

Major household expenditure
0.2180
Minor household expenditure
0.2008
Family planning decisions
0.0856
Decisions regarding child
0.0756
health
Decisions regarding child
45.97
0.0593
feeding
Note: All Kappa statistic values significant at P<0.001
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n
472
1188
788
1190
1190

Table 4.7: Multilevel regression analysis explaining the relationship of men’s and
women’s bargaining domain with child HAZ (n=2,164)
Bargaining Domains

Men’s and
Women’s
Bargaining
Together
Model 3

Interaction
with men’s
bargaining

-

0.0514
(P=0.047)

0.0227
(P=0.296)

0.00660
(P=0.903)

-

-0.00601
(P=0.912)

-0.0233
(P=0.848)

Workload

-0.0508
(P=0.013)

-

-0.0522
(P=0.011)

-0.0109
(P=0.553)

Household
DecisionMaking

-0.0457
(P=0.058)

-

-0.0425
(P=0.077)

0.000898
(P=0.964)

-

-0.0255
(P=0.233)

-0.0308
(P=0.154)

-

-

0.155
(0.003)

0.156
(P=0.003)

-

Workload

-

-0.000178
(0.993)

0.00483
(P=0.805)

-

Household
DecisionMaking

-

-0.0391
(P=0.066)

-0.0412
(P=0.053)

-

Women’s Domains
Ownership
& Control
of assets
Social
Participation

Men’s Domains
Ownership
& Control
of assets
Social
Participation

Women’s
Bargaining

Men’s
Bargaining

Model 1

Model 2

0.0388
(P=0.128)
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Model 4

Table 4.8: Path coefficients for mediation analysis linking bargaining domains, food insecurity, and child HAZ (n=2,164)
Bargaining
Domains
Women’s
Domains
Ownership
& Control
of assets
Social
Participation

Women’s Bargaining
Model 5
Leg 1
Leg 2
Direct

Leg 1

Men’s Bargaining
Model 6
Leg 2

Direct

Women’s and men’s bargaining together
Model 7
Leg 1
Leg 2
Direct
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-0.0519
(P=0.015)

0.0518
(P=0.044)

-

-

-

-0.0565
(P=0.037)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

0.0641
(P=0.020)

-0.0612
(P=0.273)

-0.0519
(P=0.015)

-0.00857
(P=0.867)

-

-

-

-0.0560
(P=0.311)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

-0.0236
(P=0.647)

Workload

-0.00819
(P=0.723)

-0.0519
(P=0.015)

-0.0535
(P=0.014)

-

-

-

-0.00396
(P=0.865)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

-0.0547
(P=0.011)

Household
DecisionMaking

0.0750
(P=0.002)

-0.0519
(P=0.015)

-0.0462
(P=0.071)

-

-

-

0.0728
(P=0.002)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

-0.0431
(P=0.088)

-

-

-

-0.0353
(P=0.063)

-0.0527
(P=0.014)

-0.0155
(P=0.398)

-0.0294
(P=0.097)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

-0.0246
(P=0.196)

-

-

-

-0.131
(P=0.002)

-0.0527
(P=0.014)

0.159
(P=0.001)

-0.125
(P=0.003)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

0.161
(P=0.001)

Workload

-

-

-

-0.0366
(P=0.081)

-0.0527
(P=0.014)

-0.00576
(P=0.788)

-0.0363
(P=0.086)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

0.0000629
(P=0.998)

Household
DecisionMaking

-

-

0.0115
(P=0.663)

-0.0527
(P=0.014)

-0.0367
(P=0.106)

0.00877
(P=0.735)

-0.0495
(P=0.019)

-0.0411
(P=0.062)

Men’s
Domains
Ownership
& Control
of assets
Social
Participation

-

-0.0628
(P=0.021)

Leg 1 denotes the relationship between bargaining domains and food insecurity, the first leg of the indirect path.
Leg 2 denotes the relationship between food insecurity and child HAZ, the second leg of the indirect path.
Direct denotes the direct path from bargaining domains and child HAZ.

Table 4.9: Contribution of significant indirect legs of paths linking specific bargaining domains, food insecurity,
and child HAZ (n=2,164)
Bargaining
Domains

Women’s Bargaining
Indirect
Effect
(P-value)
[% of total
effect]
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Women’s
Domains
Ownership
and Control
of Assets
Household
decisionmaking
Men’s
domains
Social
Participation

Direct
Effect
(P-value)

Men’s Bargaining
Total
Effect

Women’s and Men’s Bargaining

Indirect
Effect
(P-value)
[% of total
effect]

Direct
Effect
(P-value)

Total
Effect

Indirect
Effect
(P-value)
[% of
total
effect]

Direct
Effect
(P-value)

0.00280
(P=0.132)
[3.88%]
-0.00360
(P=0.040)
[7.71%]

0.0641
(P=0.020)

0.0721

-0.0431
(P=0.088)

-0.0467

0.00620
(P=0.069)
[3.71%]

0.161
(P=0.001)

0.167

0.00326
(P=0.101)
[5.92%]
-0.00389
(P=0.035)
[7.76%]

0.0518
(P=0.044)

0.0551

-

-

-

-0.0462
(P=0.071)

-0.0501

-

-

-

-

-

0.159
(P=0.001)

0.166

0.00689
(P=0.055)
[4.15%]
Indirect effect is the product of coefficients of leg 1 and leg 2
Direct effect is the coefficient of the direct path
Total effect is the sum of direct and indirect effects

Total
Effect

Bargaining Domains
1. Ownership and control
of assets
2. Social Participation
3. Workload
4. Decision-making
control

Leg 1

Household food
insecurity

Leg 2
Child HAZ

Direct Effect

Figure 4.2: Path diagram for generalized structural equation modeling analysis
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary of Findings
We conducted a quantitative analysis to understand the relationship between
gendered intra-household bargaining power and child feeding and nutrition in rural
Nepal. We assessed how bargaining power operates via two specific mechanisms: 1)
exposure to IYCF information for understanding the role of women’s bargaining power
in child feeding practices, and 2) household food insecurity to assess how women’s and
men’s bargaining influences child nutritional status.
Women’s social participation was positively associated with access to IYCF
information, which was consequently associated with improved early initiation and
dietary diversity. Higher men’s social participation was associated with lower food
insecurity, and in turn with greater HAZ. Women’s ownership and control of assets was
positively associated with child nutritional status, while men’s ownership and control of
assets did not have a significant relationship with child HAZ. Women’s workload was
negatively related to child HAZ thereby indicating possible trade-offs in time allocation
and child care affecting child nutritional status. Men’s workload did not have a
significant relationship with child HAZ. Women’s household decision-making was
positively related to exclusive breastfeeding and early initiation, but was related to
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greater food insecurity. Men’s household decision-making was not related to food
insecurity or child HAZ.
We found small but significant effects for the relationships between specific
bargaining domains with IYCF practices and with child HAZ. Our results suggest that
our measures capture intended constructs of intra-household bargaining power, i.e., our
measures are non-random and have been used in previous research.22,23,130 The small
magnitude of our coefficients may be due to the examination of more distal social factors
related to child nutrition which may not capture the full extent of a given domain through
a given measure or indicator. Significant findings in our research suggest that these
bargaining domains need further examination and evaluation for research and
programmatic purposes to understand their effect on child nutrition and to determine the
usefulness of focusing on specific domains for interventions to improve women’s status
in the household and the community.
5.2 Contribution to Literature
Our study contributes to the existing literature on gender and nutrition by 1)
providing a comprehensive understanding of intra-household bargaining beyond
commonly used measures of education and decision-making power, 2) contributing to
address the research gap by examining mechanisms linking bargaining domains and child
feeding and nutrition, and 3) providing evidence on the role of men in child nutrition, a
topic that is considerably understudied.
Evidence on women’s status and its relationship with child feeding and nutrition
has largely focused on women’s autonomy or household decision-making.89,90,109,187,188
Our study contributes to this existing evidence on women’s empowerment or bargaining
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power using multiple domains of bargaining that capture the multifaceted nature of
bargaining to include not only household decision-making, but also economic resources,
social participation, workload, and time. Prior studies in Nepal based on the Suaahara
project sample have focused on women’s empowerment in agriculture to include domains
similar to our studies on asset ownership, social participation, and workload, which have
shown association with specific domains and child nutritional status.22,23 Our research
delves deeper to assess possible mechanisms that link the specific bargaining domains
with IYCF practices and child nutritional status, thereby addressing the research gap in
empowerment literature on understating specific linkages between bargaining and child
nutrition.82,129 We also assess specific domains of men’s bargaining power, which
provides a comprehensive analysis of overall household dynamics for men and women
and suggests that incorporating multiple domains of household bargaining for men and
women is critical to understand how gendered intra-household bargaining influences
child nutrition beyond autonomy or household decision-making.
We studied men’s bargaining power and its relationship with child nutrition. We
provide evidence on domains other than those commonly studied such as paternal
education.20,189,190 The positive relationship between men’s social participation and child
nutritional status suggests a possible increase in social capital to access knowledge or
material resources obtained through group membership. The effect of men’s group
membership on food insecurity provides evidence on a factor not previously studied and
highlights the need for further research to understand how social participation influences
food security for evidence-based programming that could engage men.
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Our research suggests that exposure to ICYF is a critical precursor to gaining
more knowledge and consequently improving IYCF practices. Having empirical evidence
for this relationship is important because care practices are crucial in the first 24 months
of life, not only for health, but also for overall growth and development.
5.3 Limitations
We analyzed a cross-sectional dataset and therefore making causal inferences
would not be applicable. Having follow-up data would have enabled us to understand any
possible change in overall bargaining power over time due to changes in social context or
through program or intervention for women and men. It would also have enabled us to
understand how different bargaining domains may influence one another since there is
reciprocity between domains. We also recognize that IYCF practices may relate to child
nutritional status in our sample, and using longitudinal data would help rigorously test
this relationship. We found that there was low agreement between spouses on their
decision-making control, which could either be a result of differential cognition between
men and women about the decisions or be due socially desirable responses provided to
highlight greater personal autonomy.
Domestic violence is an important domain of household bargaining. Experiences
with domestic violence are associated with distress and with low food
insecurity.185,186,191,192 Understanding the effect of domestic violence experience would be
crucial to not only understand its effect of child feeding and nutrition, but also to
understand the interrelationship between other bargaining domains and domestic
violence.
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5.4 Implications for Future Research
Future research could focus on improving certain measures of bargaining power,
especially related to household decision-making, which yielded some unexpected
findings in our research. Improvement in cognitive interviewing and improved data
collection technique should be used to improve the understanding of questions and
generate responses that truly reflect an individual’s control over decision-making in the
household.
Future research can expand the measures for understanding the social dimension
of women’s bargaining power to include measures of structural social capital including
social network characteristics and duration of social participation. Frequency of group
membership activities and duration could be measured against time and opportunity costs
of participation in community groups versus the expected nutrition benefit through
participation. Measures of cognitive social capital aspects of trust, reciprocity, and social
support will further enable understanding the psychosocial aspects and cognitive
processes, which could then be suitable to testing mechanisms related nutrition
knowledge and awareness with regards to child feeding.
Food security is an important mediator between bargaining power and child
nutritional status, and therefore related aspects such as intra-household food allocation
should also be studied in relation to the mother and child when analyzing women’s
bargaining power. Maternal and child diet diversity are related193 and may be related to
food allocation; therefore understanding maternal food allocation is critical to account for
the societal gender bias and traditional customs and norms, which may limit women’s
access to food.
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Men’s social participation was a significant predictor of child nutritional status
and food security. Future studies could consider to routinely incorporating questions on
men’s role in child nutrition beyond common measures of paternal education or
wage/income. Specific information such as actual time spent on child care may provide
valuable information regarding the workload domain for men and women and allow the
assessment of paternal contribution is child health and nutrition. Information can also be
obtained on men’s access, knowledge, and awareness of child feeding practices to
understand the contribution of cognitive and access-related factors in child nutrition.
Intra-household bargaining involves the relative social and economic position of a
person within a household. In this research, we studied the role of men, but in South
Asian settings it is fairly common for a household to comprise of other influential figures.
Elderly females such as grandmothers of children within a household may play an
important in determining a mother’s access to resources, her workload, and her
knowledge. Information regarding understanding the relative influence of elderly women
versus husband or men in the household could help gain important information of other
factors influencing women’s bargaining power.
Nepal has a high prevalence of migration that affects the household structure and
dynamics.194 Migration is associated with changes in female employment, overall
household income, social capital, and women’s workload,195,196 all of which can relate to
women’s bargaining power. Future studies are needed to understand how bargaining
power is influenced by different household structures due to migration, and how that
relates to child nutrition.
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When feasible, bargaining studies may be complemented with qualitative inquiry to
understand the contextual factors that are likely to influence bargaining and provide a
more nuanced view of the household dynamics of different family members.
5.5 Implications for Programs and Policies
The current research underscores the importance of women’s bargaining in
positively contributing to child nutrition, specifically highlighting that improvement
women’s social participation, workload, and ownership and control of assets can
significantly lead to more positive outcomes for feeding practices and nutritional status.
Our study provides further evidence that working in the area of women-centered
community groups offers significant benefits to women and children to improve social
and economic aspects of bargaining power. More context-specific strategies could be
applied to improve asset ownership and women’s participation in income generating
activities based on local economies.
Programs supporting men’s engagement in child nutrition through social
participation may prove beneficial and contribute to improved child nutrition. Programs
targeting men often include agriculture or livelihood groups; these groups could be made
more comprehensive by involving targeted meetings of child health and nutrition, to
combine nutrition-sensitive and nutrition-specific approaches in one setting. Programs
promoting higher men’s involvement in women’s health by increasing men’s
participation in family planning and antenatal care visits, and involving men in child
nutrition monitoring and care may also benefit by improving their knowledge and
awareness regarding child nutrition.
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The importance of exposure to ICYF information, especially with regards to
social participation domains, suggests that programs aiming to improve IYCF practices
should ensure that appropriate, targeted IYCF messages are delivered to mothers through
various delivery platforms. Improving women’s knowledge would not only require
increasing women’s bargaining power, but also investing in strengthening health systems
by improving availability and access to services and personnel, which can provide
appropriate knowledge, services, and on-going to support to follow and maintain
appropriate IYCF practices. Since improving access to IYCF information is critical,
resources should be mobilized to improve messaging through mass media by national
governments and non-governmental agencies, which has shown to improve IYCF
knowledge and practices.170,197
Since women’s status is determined by the sociocultural context, efforts should
also be made in addressing basic issues such as education and adolescent health through
policy changes at the local and national level, to empower women possibly before
marriage and childbearing to maximize the time available for optimal child health and
nutrition. Given the strong momentum to address gender inequalities and reduce child
undernutrition, programs and policies should focus on evidence-based strategies that aim
to improve specific domains of intra-household bargaining to achieve targeted results in
child nutrition.
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Section B: Access to Capital
Instructions: The purpose of this module is to get an idea about women's access to and control of capital/assets. First
answer 402.1 for all the assets listed from 1-16. ThenAPPENDIX
return to the top ofAthe table and then ask 402.2-402.6 for for only the
assets which the
household has.
EMPOWERMENT
SECTION OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Read aloud: Now we have some questions about your household’s access to capital/assets and who in the household has

Empowerment
Module of
thewe
Suaahara
Survey we mean the person who has the final say over that asset.
ownership of these resources?
When
ask about ownership

Read aloudsections
(before 402.3):
When
we askare
about
selling, giving
away and renting these are different actions. Selling an item
Relevant
from the
module
provided
below.

means to get rid of the asset in exchange for money. To give something away means to let someone permanently have the
item free of charge. To mortgage or rent out means to temporarily allow someone use of the asset in exchange for a
1. orEconomic
domain
module
payment
service or some
other return.
For example, one household member may have the ability to let a friend rent the
farm equipment, but not be able to make decisions about whether or not to sell that same item.
402

S.N.

Productive Capital

1.

Agricultural land

2.

Other land not used for agriculture

3.

5.

Large livestock (e.g. oxen, cattle, buffalo,
horse)
Small livestock (goats, pigs, sheep, chickens,
ducks, pigeons)
Fish pond or fishing equipment

6.

Farm equipment (non-mechanized)

7.

Farm equipment (mechanized e.g. tractor)

8.

Non-farm business equipment (e.g. roti oven,
sewing machine, solar panels, blacksmith
equipment)
House (and other structures)

4.

9.

402.1
Does anyone in
your household
currently have
any _____?

402.2
Who would
you say
owns most
of the
_____?

402.3
Who can
decide
whether to
sell _____
most of the
time?

402.4
Who can
decide
whether to
give away
_____most
of the time?

402.5
Who can
decide to
mortgage or
rent out
_____most of
the time?

(Code list
below)

(Code list
below)

(Code list
below)

(Code list
below)

Yes...............1
No ................2

402.6
Who
contributes
most to
decisions
regarding a
new purchase
of _____?
(Code list
below)

10. Large consumer durables (ex: fridge, TV,
sofa)
11. Small consumer durables (ex: radio,
cookware)
12. Mobile phone
13. Transportation (motorized or not motorized,
e.g. bicycle, motorcycle, car, horse cart)
14. Jewelry (silver)
15. Jewelry (gold)
16. Savings (in bank, at home, etc.)
Code list for 402.2, 402.3, 402.4, 402.5 and 402.6
01 = Self
05 = Other female household member
02 = Spouse
06 = Self and other household member(s)
03 = Self and spouse jointly
07 = Spouse and other household member(s)
04 = Other male household
08 = Self, spouse and other household member(s)
member
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09 = Someone (or group of people) outside
the household
10 = Self and other outside people
11 = Spouse and other outside people
12 = Self, spouse and other outside people.

roads, water supplies) to be built in your
community?
410.2

Ensure proper payment of wages for public
works or other similar programs?

410.3

Protest the misbehavior of authorities or
elected officials?

2. Social domain module
411

S.N.

1.

Yes, but with a great deal of difficulty........... 2
Yes, but with a little difficulty ....................... 3
Yes, mostly comfortable ................................ 4
Yes, very comfortable .................................... 5
No, not at all comfortable .............................. 1
Yes, but with a great deal of difficulty........... 2
Yes, but with a little difficulty ....................... 3
Yes, mostly comfortable ................................ 4
Yes, very comfortable .................................... 5
No, not at all comfortable .............................. 1
Yes, but with a great deal of difficulty........... 2
Yes, but with a little difficulty ....................... 3
Yes, mostly comfortable ................................ 4
Yes, very comfortable .................................... 5

411.1

411.2

411.3

411.4

Is there a ____ in
your community?

Are you a member/active
member of any ______?

How much input
do you have in
making decisions
in this ________?

Why are you
not a member
of ________?

Yes......................... 1 Yes member ............... 1
No .......................... 2 Yes active
Next group
member....................... 2
No ............................... 3
411.4
(Explain that "active
member" means one
who attends meetings,
participates in
discussions, volunteers,
etc.)

Group Membership

(Code list below)
(Go to next
group)
(Code list below)

Agricultural/livestock/fisheries producer
group (including marketing groups)

Section
G:users’
Time
Allocation
2. Water
group
3. Land/forest
users'
groups
Read
aloud: We are
also
interested in knowing about how you allocate your time for both work and leisure
activities.
4. Credit or microfinance group
S.N.
Question
Response
Go to
413Mutual
Was
yesterday
a typical
Yes .......................................................... 1
416
help
or insurance
group day?
5.
(including burial societies)
No .......................................................... 2
414TradeWas
the day before
a typical day?
Yes .......................................................... 1
416
6.
and business
association
No .......................................................... 2
(improving
community)
or before were Public holiday ......................................... 1
415CivicIfgroup
neither
yesterday
nor the day
7.
charitable group (helping others)
typical days, then why?
Sick ......................................................... 2
Sick child ................................................ 3
8. Religious group
Travel or away from home ..................... 4
9. Mother's group
Visitors ................................................... 5
Strike/Bandha ......................................... 6
Other women’s group (only if it does not
10.
Other (Specify) ..................................... 96
fit into one of the other categories)
96 Other (Specify) __________
Instructions: If yesterday was a typical day ask the respondent about yesterday. If yesterday was atypical, but the day before
typical, please ask the respondent to consider the day before's activities. If both days were atypical (answer for both 413 and
Code
list forthen
411.3
414
is "No"),
please ask the respondent
to for
consider
Code list
411.4yesterday's activities.
01 = No input
01 = Not interested
05 = Group meeting location not
Please probe and account for activities by 30 minute time slots to get correct time allocation. Fill the log sheet (blank sheet)
02 = Input into very few decisions 02 = No time
convenient
with the activities right from the time the respondent woke-up yesterday morning to the time the respondent went to
03 = Input
into First,
some use
decisions
03 of
= Unable
raisewhat
entrance
06 hours
= Family
dispute/not
allowed
sleep
at night.
a blank sheet
paper totonote
was fees
done all day (24
including
morning,
day to
or join
night).
04
=
Input
into
most
decisions
04
=
Unable
to
raise
reoccurring
fees
07 = add
Not up.
allowed
because should
of sex add up to
Add up the number of minutes for each category and then make sure the columns each
All activities
05
=
Input
into
all
decisions
96
=
Other
(Specify)____________
a total of 24 hours.
06 = Decision not made
Once you have added up all of the columns, if you do not reach 24 hours or 1440 minutes, please probe until you can fill in
the missing minutes.
28

Read aloud: Please describe all the time you gave to work and leisure activities you engaged in, since the time you woke up
3.
Workload domain module
yesterday (or day before, where applicable). Please include time for traveling and commuting as part of the time for a given
activity.
416

Activities

1

Sleeping and resting

2
3

Personal care
(eating/drinking/hygiene)
School (also homework)

4

Work as employed for others

5

Work as self employed

6

Farming/livestock/fishing

7

Domestic work
(shopping/getting service,
cooking, weaving, sewing)
Care for children/adults/elderly

8
9

10

Leisure (e.g., watching T.V./
listening to radio/reading/
roaming around/playing/talking
on phone)
Social and religious activities

96

Other (Specify) ____________

Early Morning Mid Morning
(4am -8am)
(8am-12pm)
(Total 240
(Total 240
minutes)
minutes)

Afternoon
(12pm-4pm)
(Total 240
minutes)

Total Time

30

147

Evening
(4pm-8pm)
(Total 240
minutes)

Night
(8pm-4am)
(Total 480
minutes)

Section F: Decision-Making
Instructions: Please ensure that the respondent understand these decision making concept by repeating
definitions, explaining, and giving example as often as needed. Also, if the household does not take part in the
mentioned activity, then write '95' and skip to next activity.
Read aloud: Now I would like some information about decision making in your household. Please remember
that when we ask who has the ability to make a decision about something it is the person who has the very
important/primary
say and not just someone
involved
in discussions about that topic. We are interested in
4.Household
decision-making
control
module
knowing who has the key role in making decisions.
412

S.N.

412.1

Activities

1.

Agricultural production (what to
grow and types of crops to plant)

2.

Taking crops to the market (when
and who will take crops to market)

3.

Livestock raising

4.

Non-farm business activity

5.

Your own (singular) wage or salary
employment

6.
7.

412.2

Who normally takes To what extent
the decision
can you make
regarding _____?
decisions
regarding ____ if
(If self, write 01
you want(ed) to?
and skip to next
activity)
(Code list below)
(Code list below)

412.3
412.4
412.5
Read aloud: I am going to give you some reasons
why you act as you do in the activities I just
mentioned. You might have several reasons for
doing what you do and there is no right or wrong
answer. Please tell me to what extent you agree
with these statements.
Regarding ___ Regarding
Regarding
I do what I do _____ I do
_____ I do what
partly because what I do so
I do because I
I will get in
others don’t
personally think
trouble if I do think poorly of it is the right
differently.
me.
thing to do.
(Code list
below)

(Code list
below)

(Code list
below)

Major household expenditures (e.g.,
refrigerator, T.V.)
Minor household expenditures (e.g.,
food for daily consumption or other
household necessities)

8.

Use of family planning products

9.

Your health and nutrition

10.

Children’s health care

11.

Feeding children

12.

How to keep yourself from domestic
violence

13.

To go to your mother's or friend's
house

Code list for 412.1
01 = Self
02 = Spouse
03 = Self and spouse jointly
04 = Other male household member
05 = Other female household member
06 = Self and other household member(s)
07 = Spouse and other household
member(s)

08 = Self, spouse and other household
ember(s)
09 = Someone (or group of people)
outside the household
10 = Self and other outside people
11 = Spouse and other outside people
12 = Self, spouse and other outside
people
95 = Decision not made
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Code list for 412.2

Code list for 412.3,
412.4 and 412.5

01 = Not at all
02 = To a small
extent
03 = To some extent
04 = To a large
extent

01 = Strongly disagree
02 = Disagree
03 = Somewhat
agree/disagree
04 = Agree
05 = Strongly agree

